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When Deborah Weisman's middle school class graduated, little did
the students expect that a year later the United States Supreme Court
would characterize their graduation ceremony as "a state-sanctioned
religious exercise in which the student was left with no alternative but
to submit."' However, several days before graduation, Deborah and her
father attempted to make this point by seeking to bar public school
officials from their practice of including an invocation to God in the
ceremony.2 Their motion failed, but days later they returned to court in
an attempt to permanently bar prayers at future graduations as a viola-
tion of the First Amendment's prohibition against state-established reli-
gion.3 Their case, Lee v. Weisman,4 went all the way to the Supreme
Court, providing an opportunity, some thought, for the Court finally to
unify the long-debated and much-unsettled area of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence under a cohesive analytical theory. Over the years, the
Court had built up and torn down the so-called "wall of separation"
between church and state in its attempts to develop a standard against
which to measure Establishment Clause challenges. For those who
hoped Weisman would provide that standard, the Court's reasoning
behind its decision that the school graduation prayers violated the First
Amendment was disappointing. The decision was narrowly focused and
its soundness questionable. Rather than moving the Court forward, the
decision merely marked another brick in the old "wall" constructed by
the Court forty-five years ago.'
This Note will examine the Court's disappointing decision in Lee v.
Weisman and its implications for First Amendment analysis. Part II lays
down the historical underpinnings of Establishment Clause case law,
1. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2660 (1992).
2. Id. at 2654.
3. Id.
4. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
5. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
6. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
with particular attention to the Court's analytical trends.7 The facts of
the case are presented in Part III,' followed by an analysis of the major-
ity, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Part IV.9 In Part V, the edu-
cational, legislative, judicial and social impacts of the Court's decision
are considered." Part VI concludes with a look at what might be con-
sidered the missed opportunities in Lee v. Weisman."
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment states in pertinent part that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof."12 This Amendment reflected the determination
of America's early settlers that the federal government would not ob-
struct their religious freedom in the newly established nation."' One of
the first images used to embrace the intentions of the Establishment
Clause was that of a "wall of separation between church and state."4
7. See infra notes 12-177 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 178-90 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 191-284 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 285-327 and accompanying text.
11. See infra pp. 258-59.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
13. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1947). The colonists had mem-
ories of the religious persecution they fled England and Europe to escape, but at the
time of the drafting of the First Amendment, they were also witnessing the Old
World practices beginning to thrive in the new America. Colonists sought freedom in
America from England's governmentally ordained religion, and instead they found
churches established under English charters commanding the colonists' loyalty and
support. Taxes were imposed to support the government-sponsored churches and non-
adherents were persecuted. Id. See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 427-28 (1962).
(citing SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902) (stating
that by the time of the Revolutionary War, the Church of England was the estab-
lished church in at least 7 of the 13 original colonies and established religions and
religious persecution existed in several others)). It is in this context that the First
Amendment language enjoys its full meaning. For an extended discussion of the First
Amendment's historical framework, see generally LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISH-
MENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELI-
GION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1985); ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE (1982); MARK D. W. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965); PAUL K. KAUPER, RELIGION
AND THE CONSTITUTION (1964); LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (1967).
14. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. The Court borrowed the phrase from Thomas Jeffer-
son, one of the framers of the First Amendment, who used the metaphor in an 1802
letter to the Danbury Baptist Association. Id. Although the image of the wall has
endured for decades, it has not escaped criticism. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct.
2479 (1985), Justice Rehnquist argued that the wall of -separation is "a metaphor
based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging."
Id. at 2516 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The image of the wall was seldom useful and often challenged or sim-
ply ignored over the years. However, the image persisted into the pres-
ent, particularly in school prayer cases, as the Court attempted to shape
an analytical formula that it could apply with consistency to Establish-
ment Clause challenges.
A. The 1940s: The Wall of Separation
In 1947, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment became
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson
v. Board of Education,5 in which the Court first acknowledged a wall
of separation between church and state. In Everson, a taxpayer chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that authorized re-
imbursement to parents for the transportation of children attending
sectarian" schools.7 Justice Black, delivering the Court's opinion, de-
voted substantial efforts to reviewing the evil and fearful times in colo-
nial America that led to the drafting of the First Amendment, especially
with respect to the abusive imposition of taxes to support religion. 8
The Court spoke of a "high and impregnable" wall of separation be-
15. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, Justice Black referred to the incorporation of
the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause seven years earlier in Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and determined that "there is every reason to give the
same application and broad interpretation to the 'establishment of religion' clause."
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. For a provocative argument challenging the incorporation of
the Establishment Clause against the states, see Note, Rethinking the Incorporation
of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1700 (1992) (argu-
ing that the original intent of the Establishment Clause was to curb federal intrusion
in church-state activities. Applying a federalist reading to the Clause, while advancing
the theory of "selective incorporation" over total incorporation, the author finds the
Establishment Clause a "poor candidate" for application against the states.)
16. One commentator argues that "sectarian" is a term of exclusion, used primarily
to humiliate and marginalize certain groups of people. Richard A. Baer, Jr., The
Supreme Court's Discriminatory Use of the Term "Sectarian," 6 J. L & POL 449
(1990).
17. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3. The New Jersey statute stated: "Whenever in any
district there are children living remote from any schoolhouse, the board of education
of the district may make rules and contracts for the transportation of such children
to and from school, including the transportation of school children to and from
school other than a public school." Id. (citing 1941 N.J. LAWS '191). Based on this
statute, the township of Ewing's board of education passed a resolution to reimburse
parents who used public transportation to bus their children to school. Id. Some
reimbursements paid for the transportation of children to Catholic schools in the
area. Id.
18. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-15.
tween church and state that should resist the slightest breach,'" yet
ultimately held that the statute did not violate the Establishment
Clause.'m The Court did clarify, however, those state actions that would
breach the wall of separation: the state could not set up a church, pass
laws that aid one religion over another, coerce a person to attend or
refrain from attending church, support religious activities or institutions
with taxes, or participate in the affairs of religious organizations.2 The
Court lowered the wall when it distinguished "neutral" state services,
such as police and fire protection, public highways, sidewalks, and
sewage disposal, which it considered "indisputably marked off from the
religious function" and, thus, not violative of the First Amendment.' It
was in this category of permissible state services that the Court placed
the public busing of religious school students, claiming that to do other-
wise would cast the state in an adversarial role.'
One year later, Justice Black, in McCoUum v. Board of Education,'
referred to his reasoning in Everson to prohibit a public school district
from allowing religious instruction during school hours.'m Delivering
the Court's opinion, Justice Black stated that the Champaign, Illinois,
Board of Education's practice of allowing religious instructors to con-
duct weekly classes on campus was "beyond all question a utilization of
the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid reli-
gious groups to spread their faith."'m The Court emphasized the imper-
missible integration of church and state that occurs when the compul-
19. Id. at 18.
20. Id. at 2. Perhaps the Court, in this first state case, set the tone for the ambi-
guity that would follow in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Jackson characterized the Court's holding as "utterly discordant" with
its stated intention to completely and uncompromisingly separate church from state.
Id. at 19 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 15-16. For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions regarding public
support of sectarian schools, see Ralph M. Silberman, Annotation, Supreme Court's
Views Regarding State Aid to Sectarian Schools Under Establishment and Preedom
of Religion Clauses of United States Constitution, 63 L ED. 2D 804 (1992).
22. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18.
23. Id. at 18. The Court stated that cutting off general services to religious schools
might discourage attendance or make it difficult for the schools to function. That, the
Court stated, is not the intent of the First Amendment. Id. at 17-18.
24. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
25. Id. at 212. A religious association made up of Jews, Catholics, and Protestants
obtained permission from the Champaign, Illinois, Board of Education to offer reli-
gious instruction in the public schools on a weekly basis. The classes were conduct-
ed in public school classrooms during school hours and were attended by pupils with
their parents' approval. Students enrolled in the religious classes were required to be
present. The religious instructors received no salary from the school, but the school's
superintendent hired and supervised the instructors. Id. at 207-09.
26. Id. at 210.
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sory public education system is used to provide pupils for religious
indoctrination.'
B. The 1950s: The Neutral Services Test
Four years later, the Court in Zorach v. Clauson' reaffirmed the
image of the wall when it declared that the separation between church
and state must be complete and unequivocal.' At the same time, how-
ever, the Court declared as constitutional the New York law that al-
lowed public schools to release students during school hours for reli-
gious instruction.' Justice Douglas, delivering the majority opinion,
stated that on the one hand, the First Amendment's prohibition against
the establishment of religion is absolute and "permits no exception.""1
However, on the other hand, the First Amendment does not demand a
separation of church and state in every respect.' Justice Douglas de-
clared: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Su-
preme Being." ' The Court called for a common sense approach to the
scope of First Amendment prohibitions to accommodate the people's
spiritual needs and to prevent suspicion and hostility between state and
religion.' As in Everson, the Court distinguished permissible neutral
state practices from state practices that establish a religion. The Court
included prayers in legislative halls, presidential messages invoking the
deity, and courtroom oaths to God, among other activities, as not viola-
tive of Establishment Clause proscriptions.' To make them so, Justice
27. Id. at 212.
28. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). See Note, The "Released Time" Cases Revisited: A Study
of Group Decisionmaking by the Supreme Court, 83 YALE L.J. 1202 (1974).
29. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312.
30. Id. at 315. The Court distinguished Zorach's "released time" program from
McCollum's, based on the level of school support behind the program. In Zorach, stu-
dents were allowed to leave during the regular school day to attend off-campus reli-
gious classes. No instruction took place in public school classrooms, no public funds
were expended, and the school district did not supervise or approve the religious
teachers or their curricula. Id.
31. Id. at 312.
32. Id. Justice Douglas found a clarity in the First Amendment that has eluded
other Courts to this day. According to the Justice, the First Amendment "studiously
defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union
or dependency" of church and state. Id. Justice Douglas did not elaborate on which
of the 10 words in the Establishment Clause he felt provided this specific and defini-
tive guidance.
33. Id. at 313.
34. Id. at 312.
35. Id. at 313. For extended discussions of the concept of neutrality in Establish-
Douglas concluded, would be "flouting" the First Amendment.'
C. The 1960s: The Purpose and Effect Test
Nine years later, however, in McGowan v. State of Maryland,7 Jus-
tice Douglas departed from his reasoning in Zorach when he refused to
classify the state's "Sunday Closing Laws"' as neutral state action and
dissented' when the majority held that the laws did not violate the
First Amendment.' The statute's purpose and effect, the Court stated,
is to provide a uniform day of rest for citizens, and the fact that Sunday
happens also to be a symbolically significant day for Christians should
not hinder the state from carrying out its secular aims.4 As the Court
reasoned, "the 'Establishment Clause' does not ban federal or state
regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coin-
cide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions."4'
The following year, in Engel v. Vitale,' the Court raised the wall
against nondenominational prayer in New York schools, even if the
students voluntarily participated." Without actually mentioning the
ment Clause analysis, see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Signifi-
cance of Neutral Principles, 78 CoLuM. L. REV. 982 (1978); William E. Nelson, History
and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237 (1986); John T.
Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PIrrT. L.
REV. 83 (1986).
36. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313.
37. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
38. In general, these statutes prohibit all labor, business and other commercial
activities on Sunday. Id. at 422.
39. Id. at 561 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 452-53. The Court traced the closing laws back to their thirteenth centu-
ry origins and concluded that although originally the laws' purpose was to "keep[]
holy the Lord's day," the laws had evolved over the centuries into a modern-day
secular means to enforce relaxation from the work week. Id. at 432-34.
41. Id. at 445.
42. Id. at 442. To explain its reasoning, the Court referred to society's proscrip-
tions on criminal activity, such as murder. Regulation of this type of conduct, the
Court stated, was no less valid because it happened to harmonize with the tenets of
Judeo-Christian religions. Id. The Court applied similar reasoning in Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961), and Two Guys from Harrison-
Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). But cf. Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472
U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985) (finding that a statute excusing employees from working on
their oum Sabbath violated the Establishment Clause).
43. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
44. The Court clarified that the Establishment Clause, unlike the First Amendment's
Free Exercise Clause, does not require the state to show coercion. Rather, the Estab-
lishment Clause is violated by state laws or conduct that establish an official religion,
whether or not they directly coerce non-observing individuals. Id. at 424-25.
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wall, yet stressing the dangers of uniting church and state, the Court
held that the daily classroom prayer was a religious activity, "a solemn
avowal of divine faith" in the Almighty,' and, as such, was no part of
the government's business.' While on one hand, the Court acknowl-
edged that "[t]he history of man is inseparable from the history of reli-
gion,"47 the Court also emphasized the First Amendment's most imme-
diate purpose: to prevent a union of government and religion.'8
In Abington School District v. Schempp,49 the Court grappled with
the tension between the nation's religious heritage and First Amend-
ment concerns as it struck down Bible readings in public schools as
unconstitutional.' The Court emphasized that for twenty years its rul-
ings have firmly maintained the conviction that separation between
church and state must be complete and permanent."' The Court ac-
knowledged the nation's deeply embedded religious traditions,52 but
45. Id. at 424. For an examination of what "prayer" actually means within the
constitutional standard, see D.H. White, Annotation, What Constitutes "Prayer" Under
Federal Constitutional Prohibition of Prayer in Public Schools, 30 A.L.R.3D 1352
(1992). See also Annotation, Comment note: Prayers in Public Schools, 86 A.L.R.2D
1304 (1992); David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Let Us Pray (But Not "Them'?):
The Troubled Jurisprudence of Religious Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 273 (Winter
1991).
46. Engel, 370 U.S. at 429. The Court discussed at length The Book of Common
Prayer, the sixteenth-century governmental "bible" of prayers, to underscore the point
that this very practice of establishing governmentally composed prayers for religious
services was one of the reasons many of the early colonists left England and sought
religious freedom in America. Id. at 425.
47. Id. at 434.
48. Id. at 431. History reveals, the Court explained, that this union "tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion." Id. "'[E]xperience witnesseth the ecclesi-
astical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have
had a contrary operation .... pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and
servility in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution.'" Id. at 431 n.14
(quoting Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, II Writings of
Madison 183, 187).
49. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
50. Id. at 205. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania required that at least 10 verses
from the Holy Bible be read without comment at the opening of each school day.
Most often, students read the verses and were joined in the Lord's Prayer by the
class. Any student could be excused from participating in Bible readings with a note
from a parent. Id. at 205-07.
51. Id. at 217.
52. "The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God
and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in
their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself." Id. at 213. As
emphasized that religious freedom is likewise strongly embedded in the
country's public and private life.' This freedom is protected, the Court
stated, in the Establishment Clause's clear and concise language.' In a
step toward formalizing an analytical approach, the Court proposed that
the proper test for an Establishment Clause violation is one that exam-
ines the purpose and the primary effect of the state practice.' The
Court explained that if either the purpose or the effect of the state
practice advances or inhibits religion, the enactment would be unconsti-
tutional.' Examined in this way, the Court found that the Bible read-
ing was a religious ceremony and was intended by the state to be so."
"The place of religion in our society is an exalted one," the Court stat-
ed. "[It is not within the power of government to invade that cita-
del."'
In a subsequent school case, Board of Education v. Allen,' the
Court examined a statute requiring public school districts to loan text-
books to religious school students. The Court concluded that both the
statute's purpose and effect were neutral and did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause.' However, later that year, the Court, in Epperson v.
Arkansas,' relied on Schempp's purpose/effect test to invalidate a
state law that prohibited teaching the theory of evolution in public
schools.? The state's purpose in enacting the law, the Court found,
was to select "from the body of knowledge a particular segment which
in Everson, the Court referred to the contemporary manifestations of this religious
.heritage, such as the ceremonial opening prayers in Congress, presidential oaths of
office that swear "So help me God," and sessions of the Supreme Court which are
opened with an invocation to the grace of God. Id.
53. Id. at 214.
54. Id. at 222.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 224.
58. Id. at 226. For other prayer-in-school cases in which the Court applied similar
reasoning, see Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd.
of Pub. Instruction, 377 U.S. 402 (1964).
59. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
60. Id. at 237. For a provocative discussion of the merits of state-subsidized text-
books for racially discriminatory private schools, see Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455 (1973), where the Court, in dicta, distinguished Allen and found no value in
upholding governmental support of discrimination. For further Court discussion of
governmental neutrality in matters of religion, see Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437 (1971) (identifying "benevolent" neutrality as the controlling principle of the
Establishment Clause).
61. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
62. Id. at 103. In Epperson, a high school biology teacher challenged the "anti-
evolution" statute in order to be able to lawfully use a new textbook that contained
a chapter on evolution. Id. at 100.
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it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with... a
particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious
group."' The Court declared that the effect of this selective proscrip-
tion was state-endorsed religious preference, a clear violation of the
First Amendment's mandate of religious neutrality.' The Court re-
ferred to Justice Black's language twenty years before in Everson: "Nei-
ther [a State nor the Federal Government] can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."'
D. The 1970s: The Lemon Test
The Court, in Walz v. Tax Commission,' pointed out the difficulty
in toeing the mark of constitutional neutrality. In Wa/z, a property own-
er claimed that property tax exemptions for religious organizations vio-
lated the Establishment Clause.7 Characterizing the First Amendment
as "not the most precisely drawn portion[] of the Constitution,"' Jus-
tice Burger, delivering the opinion of the Court, declared that the
Amendment's purpose "was to state an objective not to write a stat-
ute."' He stated that the Court's past attempts to rigidly apply the per-
ceived mandate of neutrality have resulted in considerable inconsisten-
cy in the Court's opinions.' Justice Burger urged that continuing such
an approach could defeat the basic purpose of the Establishment
Clause.71 "The course of constitutional neutrality... cannot be an ab-
solutely straight line," Justice Burger stated. "[T]here is room for
play."' Thus, avoiding a rigidly literal interpretation of the Establish-
63. Id. at 103.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 106 (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)). However,
Justice Black, in his concurring opinion in Epperson, emphasized his reluctance to
decide Epperson at all. Id. at 110. He believed that the statute was vague, the state
had never moved to enforce it and, most important, the state should have the power
to remove a controversial class from its public school curricula. Id. at 110-13 (Black,
J., concurring).
66. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
67. Id. at 664.
68. Id. at 668.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Wa/z, 397 U.S. at 668-69.
72. Id. at 669. At the very least, the Court stated, government may be permitted to
exercise a kind of "benevolent neutrality ...generally so long as [no one religion]
was favored over others and none suffered interference." Id. at 676-77.
ment Clause, the Court held that the tax exemption for religious organi-
zations neither advanced nor inhibited religion.m The Wa/z Court re-
lied on and enlarged the purpose/effect test and explored whether a
given statute encourages excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion.74 Examined in this way, the Court concluded that "[t]here is no
genuine nexus between tax exemption and establishment of religion. "'
The Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman8 jettisoned the wall imagery of
earlier courts, stating that the First Amendment prohibitions create
something more like a barrier than a wall, "blurred" and "indistinct,"
that shifts depending on the circumstances.' 7 The Lemon Court dis-
agreed with the Abington Court's characterization of the clear and con-
cise language in the First Amendment.M Chief Justice Burger, deliv-
ering the majority opinion, claimed that the Court can only dimly per-
ceive the wall's "lines of demarcation" on the First Amendment terrain
and called the language of the religion clauses "at best opaque."' How-
ever, the Court made clear that it did not intend to "engage in a legalis-
tic minuet in which precise rules and forms" govern.' Rather, the
Court acknowledged the "extremely sensitive" nature of this area of the
law and attempted to define an appropriately flexible standard for anal-
ysis.8 In the absence of precisely stated constitutional prohibitions, the
73. Id. at 672. The state had the right, the Court determined, to identify certain
entities beneficial to the moral or mental health of the community, such as churches,
hospitals, libraries and playgrounds, and encourage their continued existence by
granting tax exemptions. Id. at 672-73. The Court distinguished this type of permissi-
ble assistance from a direct money subsidy from government to church, which would
be "a relationship pregnant with involvement." Id. at 675.
74. Id. at 674.
75. Id. at 675.
76. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, a Rhode Island statute, enacted to attract
competent teachers to private schools, provided state funds to supplement teacher
salaries in nonpublic elementary schools. Id. at 607. The Court held that the statute
unconstitutionally aided religion. Id.
77. Id. at 614. In contrast, see Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return
to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 81 CoLuM. L. REv. 1463
(1981).
78. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. In particular, the Court examined the Clause's prohibi-
tion against any law "respecting an establishment of religion." Id. A law "respecting"
an establishment of religion, the Court stated, is more difficult to decipher than an
outright violation of the Clause. Id. The court reasoned that a law might not succeed
in actually establishing a religion and yet might be "a step that could lead to such
establishment and hence offend the First Amendment." Id. It is in this context that
the Court developed the three-part Lemon test.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 614.
81. Id. at 615. The Court stressed that prior holdings do not mandate total separa-
tion between church and state, nor is such separation even possible. Id. at 614. It is
"inevitable," the Court stated, that some relationship between government and reli-
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Lemon Court developed three criteria to analyze Establishment Clause
challenges.' First, the state practice must have a "secular purpose";
second, its primary effect must not "advance or inhibit religion";' and
third, it must not create "excessive government entanglement" with religion-
gious organizations will exist in the "neutral" contacts first described in Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
82. For more than 20 years, critics have raised their pens to attack the Lemon
test. See, e.g., Timothy V. Franklin, Comment, Squeezing the Juice out of the Lemon
Test, 72 W. EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1992) (tracing the uneven application and unpredictable
results of the Lemon test, concluding that the sentiment to change Lemon is at a
"threshold level"); Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Comment, Is Lemon a Lemon? Crosscurrents
in Contemporary Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 129 (1990)
(proposing abandonment of Lemon in favor of a test focused solely on impermissible
religious purposes); Raul M. Rodriguez, Comment, God Is Dead: Killed by Fifty Years
of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1155 (1992) (criticizing
Lemon as not being in accord with the First Amendment framers' intent); Julie K
Underwood, Changing Establishment Analysis Within and Outside the Context of
Education, 33 How. LJ. 53 (1990) (comparing the differing Lemon approaches in
education and non-education settings); Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in
the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L REV. 905 (1987)
(proposing a substantial revision to each prong of the Lemon test that can be ap-
plied more 'consistently); Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First
Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817 (1984) (calling for a complete
abandonment of the "subjective" Lemon test); John H. Mansfield, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CAL L
REV. 847 (1984) (arguing for a departure from Lemon). See also Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985), in which Justice Rehnquist, in a bitter dissent, presented a roster
of contradictory decisions, all attributable to the Lemon test.
83. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The issue of what actually constitutes an impermis-
sible religious purpose is provocatively raised by Daniel 0. Conkle in Religious Pur-
pose, Inerrancy, and the Establishment Clause, 67 IND. L.J. 1 (1991) (proposing two
types of religious purposes-the "spiritual" and the "worldiy"-and sorting out which
are permissible, given the "inseparable connection" between religion, morality, and
law in contemporary society). See generally Hal Culbertson, Note, Religion in the Po-
litical Process: A Critique of Lemon's Purpose Test, 1990 U. ILL L. REV. 915 (1990)
(arguing that Lemon's purpose test unnecessarily prevents religious involvement in the
political process); Scott Titshaw, Note, Sharpening the Prongs of the Establishment
Clause: Applying Stricter Scrutiny to Majority Religions, 23 GA. L REV. 1085 (1989)
(proposing that challenged practices be viewed from the perspective of a "reasonable
humanist" on the lookout for conduct that endorses a majority religion).
84. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. An argument in favor of the effects prong alone is
offered by William B. Peterson in 'A Picture Held Us Captive. Conceptual Confusion
and the Lemon Test, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1827 (1989) (disparaging the causal connec-
tion between purpose and effect, and favoring, instead, an effects prong based on a
contextual analysis).
85. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. "In order to determine whether the government
Two years after Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court in one day struck
down two state statutes authorizing aid to church-related schools. Sloan
v. Lemon' challenged Pennsylvania's legislation reimbursing parents
for sending their children to nonpublic schools. 7 Justice Powell, writ-
ing for the Court, examined the legislation using the Lemon test and
found that the state's secular purpose of reducing the enrollment bur-
den at beleaguered public schools was valid.' Nevertheless, the reim-
bursement had the impermissible effect of advancing religion and,
therefore, violated the Establishment Clause.' Similarly, in Committee
for Public Education v. Nyquist, Justice Powell found the state's neu-
tral aim in enacting aid to nonpublic schools passed the Lemon test's
purpose prong,"' but the overall effect of state-supported religion did
not pass the Lemon test.' In both cases, the Court felt it unnecessary
to scrutinize for third prong excessive entanglement once it was estab-
lished that a violation existed.'
entanglement with religion is excessive," the Court declared, "we must examine the
character and purposes of the institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid
that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and
the religious authority." Id. at 615. For Court cases elaborating on third-prong entan-
glement, see Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (finding no entanglement);
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (no entanglement); Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U.S. 455 (1973) (no entanglement); cf. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Reli-
gious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (improper entanglement). See also Kenneth F. Rip-
ple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten-Year Assessment, 27
UCLA L. REV. 1195 (1980) (discussing the practical problems in implementing the
Lemon's entanglement prong).
86. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
87. Id. at 827.
88. Id. at 829.
89. Id. at 829-31. The Court distinguished the state's program, which "singled out a
class of its citizens for a special economic benefit . . . as an incentive to parents to
send their children to sectarian schools, or as a reward for having done so" with the
state law in Everson, in which the free bus benefits "were carefully restricted to the
purely secular side of church-affiliated institutions" by aiding all parents. Id. at 832.
90. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
91. Id. at 773.
92. Id. at 783. Appellees urged that Lemon's second prong required the Court to invali-
date a statute only if its primary effect was to subsidize religion. Id. The Court
avoided that "metaphysical" argument, stating that a law will not pass the effect test
if it has the "primary" or "direct" or "immediate" effect of advancing religion. Id.
Appellees also urged the Court to differentiate between tuition reimbursements for
money already expended on one hand and direct contributions in advance of tuition
payments or state grants directly to nonpublic schools on the other. Id. However, the
Court saw no constitutional importance in the differentiation. Id. at 784-86.
93. Sloan, 413 U.S. at 833; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 794. See also Brusca v. State Bd.
of Educ., 405 U.S. 1050 (1972) (emphasizing that the Establishment Clause cannot be
read to require state-subsidized private education).
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E. The 1980s: The Endorsement Test
In Stone v. Graham,' the Court never made it past the first prong of
the Lemon test when it held invalid a Kentucky statute that required
school officials to post the Ten Commandments in public classrooms."
Although the state claimed a neutral purpose for posting the biblical
verses,' the Court held that the primary purpose was plainly reli-
gious.' "The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text," the
Court stated, "and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular pur-
pose can blind us to that fact.""
In Larkin v. Grendel's Den," for the first time in the Lemon test's
eleven-year existence, the Court examined all three prongs of the test.
In Grendel's Den, Justice Burger; delivering the opinion of the Court,
held unconstitutional the Massachusetts statute giving churches veto
power over liquor license applications." The Court acknowledged that
the state's purpose to protect churches from the "'hurly-burly' associat-
ed with liquor outlets" was valid.' Examining the second prong of the
Lemon test, however, the Court found that the "mere appearance of a
joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and State" violated the
94. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
95. Id. at 41. See J. David Smith, Jr., Comment, Stone v. Graham: A Fragile De-
fense of Individual Religious Autonomy, 69 KY. LJ. 392 (1980-81) (contending that
.although the holding in Stone was correct, the Supreme Court "artlessly and incom-
pletely" applied the Lemon test).
96. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41. The statute required that the Ten Commandments be
followed by a small note, stating: "The secular application of the Ten Commandments
is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization
and the Common Law of the United States." Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. The Court also considered it unimportant that the Bible verses were simply
posted on the wall rather than recited in class or that the posted copies were paid
for by private contributions. Id. at 42. Mixing the language of the purpose and effects
prongs, the Court stated that the posting serves no educational purpose, but rather
would have the effect of inducing the schoolchildren "to read, meditate upon, perhaps
to venerate and obey, the Commandments." Id.
99. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
100. Id. at 127. The statute states: "'Premises . . . located within a radius of five
hundred feet of a church or school shall not be licensed for the sale of alcoholic
beverages if the governing body of such church or school files written objection
thereto.'" Id. at 117 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 16C (West 1980)).
101. Id. at 123-24. However valid the state's objective, the Court suggested that it
could be accomplished in more appropriately secular ways. For example, the state
could enact a complete ban on liquor outlets within a specified distance from
churches and schools. Id. at 124.
Establishment Clause.' 2 This time, however, the Court did not stop
after having established a violation mid-way through the Lemon analy-
sis. Rather, the Court proceeded to the third prong to examine the leg-
islation for excessive entanglement, and found that the statute
"enmeshe[d] churches in the processes of government and create[d] the
danger of '[plolitical fragmentation and divisiveness along religious
lines.' ""I The wall of separation, Justice Burger claimed, "was a useful
figurative illustration to emphasize the concept of separateness," and it
had been "substantially breached" by this legislation."°
However, in the following year, 1983, Chief Justice Burger departed
entirely from the Lemon test when he delivered the majority opinion in
Marsh v. Chambers,"5 upholding the constitutionality of opening
prayers at legislative sessions."°' Ignoring the lower court's Lemon
analysis and shunning any reference to the old wall of separation, Chief
Justice Burger instead looked to the nation's history and traditions to
support the Court's reasoning. 7 The Court examined the "unambigu-
ous and unbroken history" of more than 200 years of ceremonial prayer
from the early Continental Congress"° to the contemporary Supreme
Court'" and determined it to be "part of the fabric of our society.""'
To invoke divine guidance in this context, the Court reasoned, is not an
establishment of religion; rather, it is an "acknowledgment of beliefs
widely held among the people of this country."'
102. Id. at 125-26. The Court noted that even if the church never used the veto
power to further its own religious goals, simply possessing the power "provides a sig-
nificant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of some." Id.
103. Id. at 127 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971)).
104. Id. at 123.
105. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
106. The Nebraska Legislature opens each legislative day with a prayer by a chap-
lain paid with state funds. Id. at 784-85.
107. Id. at 786-90.
108. The Court acknowledged that historical patterns cannot justify contemporary
violations of constitutional guarantees, but in this context, their actions reveal what
the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean. Id. at 790. "Clearly the
men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid legislative
chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment, for the practice ...
has continued without interruption ever since that early session of Congress." Id. at
788. "[Tihe Founding Fathers looked at invocations as 'conduct whose . . .effect ...
harmonize[d] with the tenets of some or all religions.'" Id. at 792 (quoting McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)(alterations in original)).
109. The invocation, "God save the United States and this Honorable Court" occurs
at all Supreme. Court sessions. Id. at 786.
110. Id. at 792.
111. Id. See John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and
the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CAL. L. REV. 847 (1984) (arguing for a "single,
more encompassing construction" of the Establishment, Clause rather than repeating
"slogans" and formulas).
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The Court further chipped away at the metaphor of the wall the fol-
lowing year in Lynch v. Donnelly,"2 holding that the inclusion of a
creche in a city's annual Christmas display did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause."' Chief Justice Burger, once again delivering the majori-
ty opinion, declared that no fixed, per se rule could be framed to em-
body the Establishment Clause objectives."4 He viewed the Lemon
test, which he first introduced thirteen years earlier, as "not all-deter-
mining," 5 and characterized the wall of separation as "not a wholly
accurate description" of the relationship between church and state."'
Rather, Chief Justice Burger advised against taking a rigid, absolutist
view of the Establishment Clause and mechanically invalidating all gov-
ernmental conduct that benefits religion. Instead, challenged conduct
should be scrutinized "to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.""7 Chief Justice Burger
referred to a history "replete with official references to the value and
invocation of Divine guidance," pointing to coins inscribed with the
national motto "In God We Trust," the Pledge of Allegiance to "one
nation under God," official recognition of Christmas and other religious
holidays, along with state-supported art galleries and museums display-
ing religious paintings."8 These are government's "acknowledgement"
of our religious heritage, the Chief Justice noted, and, as such, do not
constitute an establishment of religion."' In her concurring opinion,
Justice O'Connor clarified that this "acknowledgment exception" serves
112. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See William Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court:
Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DuKE L.J.
770 (1984) (recognizing the trend toward accepting an affiliation between government
and religion, and replacing the "wall" of separation with a "bridge" toward symbiosis);
Glenn S. Gordon, Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: Breaking Doum the Barriers to Religious
Displays, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1985) (suggesting a departure from Lemon's
separationist approach for an accommodationist approach).
113. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672.
114. Id. at 678.
115. Although Chief Justice Burger acknowledged the usefulness of the Lemon test
in the past, he stressed the Court's unwillingness to be confined to any single test or
criterion in the sensitive area of Establishment Clause violations. Id. at 679.
116. Id. at 673.
117. Id. at 678 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 675.
119. Id. at 677. Focusing on the creche in particular, the Court considered it, in the
context of the overall display, to be a passive symbol in spite of its religious asso-
ciations. The benefit to religion, the Court stated, was indirect, remote, and inciden-
tal. Id. at 683.
"the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, ex-
pressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of
what is worthy of appreciation in society."2 ' However, Justice
O'Connor also cautioned that it is crucial that government acknowl-
edgement of religious traditions is not misread as government endorse-
ment or disapproval of religion.2 '
The following year, in 1985, the Court looked with more favor on the
Lemon test in three consecutive cases. In Wallace v. Jaffree," the
Court relied primarily on a Lemon analysis in its decision that a one-
minute period of silence in public schools for "meditation and voluntary
prayer" violated the Establishment Clause."' Justice O'Connor con-
curred with the opinion, but declared that the Court should refine the
Lemon test to more properly become an "endorsement test," inquiring
into whether the state practice operated as an endorsement of reli-
gion."4 Applying this analytical approach to the facts of the case, Jus-
tice O'Connor reasoned that the message to the objective observer was
that the praying child in the school room would be favored over the
120. Id. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders . . . ." Id. at 688
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor suggested a modified Lemon test in
which the purpose and effect prongs inquire into whether there is an endorsement
message in the governmental conduct. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For an
extended discussion of the' superiority of Justice O'Connor's modified Lemon test
over the original, see generally Establishment of Religion, 55 EDUC. L. REP. 807
(1985).
122. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
123. Id. at 61. See Mary E. Q. Johnson, School Prayer and the Constitution: Silence
is Golden, 48 MD. L. REV. 1018 (1989) (concluding that pure moment-of-silence
statutes do not violate the Establishment Clause); Note, The Unconstitutionality of
State Statutes Authorizing Moments of Silence in the Public Schools, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1874 (1983) (concluding that under the appropriate Establishment Clause analy-
sis, most moment-of-silence statutes are unconstitutional); David Z. Seide, Note, Daily
Moments of Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.
364 (1983) (finding classroom moments of silence unconstitutional under a proposed
standard based on religious neutrality in the schools); Patrick F. Brown, Note,
Wallace v. Jaffree and the Need to Reform Establishment Clause Analysis, 35 CATH.
U. L. REV. 573 (1986) (proposing a test to analyze the coercive nature of a state's
activities); Note, Wallace v. Jaffree: A New Twist on the Old Lemon? 13 W. ST. U. L.
REV. 659 (1986) (discussing methods of Establishment Clause analysis leading up to
and applied in Wallace).
124. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For a chronology of the devel-
opment of the endorsement test, see James M. Lewis & Michael L Vild, Note, A
Controversial Twist of Lemon: The Endorsement Test as the Establishment Clause
Standard, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671 (1990).
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nonpraying child." Justice O'Connor declared that this favoritism was
an impermissible state endorsement of religion.126 It "go[es] against the
grain," the Justice declared, "of religious liberty protected by the First
Amendment.
" 12 7
That same month, Justice O'Connor again nudged the Court toward
an analysis focused on endorsement in her concurring opinion in
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc." In Caldor, the Court found that a statute
guaranteeing employees the absolute right not to work on their Sabbath
violated the second prong of the traditional Lemon test." The Court
held that the "statute has a primary effect that impermissibly advances
a particular religious practice."3" "In essence," the Court reasoned,
"the Connecticut statute imposes on employers and employees an abso-
lute duty to conform their business practices to the particular religious
practices of the employee .... ,s" Justice O'Connor took the Court's
opinion one step further by clarifying that the statute impermissibly
advanced religion by sending a message that it endorsed Sabbath obser-
vance. " An objective observer, Justice O'Connor claimed, would no
doubt perceive that "[tihe message conveyed is one of endorsement of
a particular religious belief, to the detriment of those who do not share
it. ' 33
A few days later, in Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,' the
Court expressly reaffirmed the Lemon test as the standard for Estab-
lishment Clause challenges, particularly in school-related cases, where,
125. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
126. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). In response to Justice Rehnquist's assertion that
the drafters of the First Amendment supported prayer in public schools, Justice
O'Connor pointed out that free public education was virtually nonexistent in the late
18th century. Id. at 80 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, Justice O'Connor claimed, it
is unlikely that the framers of the Amendment anticipated the problems of church
and state interaction in this area. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
129. Id. at 707-08. The Connecticut statute declared, in pertinent part: "No person
who states that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be re-
quired by his employer to work on such day . . . and shall not constitute grounds
for his dismissal." Id. at 706 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT § 53-303e (1958)).
130. Id. at 710.
131. Id. at 709. This "unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers," the Court
emphasized, unlawfully advances a particular religious practice. Id. at 710.
132. Id. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
134. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
the Court stated, Lemon has always been relied upon.1" At issue in
Ball were two programs adopted by the city school board in which the
public school system financed classes taught in nonpublic school class-
rooms."6 Using the Lemon analysis to "give meaning to the sparse lan-
guage and broad purposes of the [Establishment] Clause,"37 the Court
invalidated both programs as posing "a substantial risk of state-spon-
sored indoctrination. '"" The Court reasoned that such indoctrination oc-
curs not only when state funds promote religion,"3 but also when the
state, through its funding efforts, becomes identified with a particular
religion.'40 Thus, a proper inquiry into the effect of state conduct tests
for a "symbolic union" of church and state,' which conveys a mes-
sage that the government endorsed or disapproved of religion.'42 "The
135. Id. at 383. "We have particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the
sensitive relationship between government and religion in the education of our chil-
dren." Id.
136. Id. at 375. The "Shared Time" program offered classes in state-required sub-
jects that were taught in private school classrooms during the regular school day by
public school teachers who traveled to the nonpublic schools. The "Community Edu-
cation" program offered classes after regular school hours to children and adults
taught by public school teachers who traveled to the nonpublic schools as well as to
other locations. Id.
137. Id. at 381-82.
138. Id. at 387. "Teachers in such an atmosphere may well subtly (or overtly)
conform their instruction to the environment in which they teach, while students will
perceive the instruction provided in the context of the dominantly religious message
of the institution, thus reinforcing the indoctrinating effect." Id. at 388. The Court did
not consider it dispositive that the respondents were unable to present specific in-
stances of religious indoctrination, allowing that that type of ideological influence
would be difficult to detect by student, parent or teacher. Id. at 388-89.
139. The Court distinguished between permissible public funding that "indirectly"
aids religion, such as the free bus transportation in Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1 (1947), and impermissible state funding that provides "direct" aid to the
religious enterprise, such as the salary supplements for religious school teachers in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), or the tuition grants for religious school
attendance in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). Ball,
473 U.S. at 393-94. The key to differentiating the permissible from the impermissible
funding, the Court stated, is whether the ultimate benefit to religion is incidental and
insubstantial or direct and substantial. Id.
140. Ball, 473 U.S. at 389.
141. See Theodore C. Hirt, "Symbolic Union" of Church and State and the "En-
dorsement" of Sectarian Activity: A Critique of Unwieldy Tools of Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 823 (1989) (arguing that "symbolic
union" analysis obscures a proper Lemon test).
142. Ball, 473 U.S. at 389-90. The Court contrasted two earlier cases based on the
extent to which a symbolic union was conveyed in each. In McCollum v. Board of
Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), the Court prohibited religious instruction in public
school classrooms, while in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), similar religious
classes offered off-campus were permitted. "[Tihe McCollum program presented the
students with a graphic symbol" of the union of church and state, the Court rea-
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inquiry into this kind of effect," the Court emphasized, "must be con-
ducted with particular care when many of the citizens perceiving the
governmental message are children in their formative years."1
43
Two years later, in Edwards v. Aguilard,4 1 the Court again relied
on the Lemon test as it struck down as unconstitutional a "Creationism
Act," forbidding public schools to teach the theory of evolution unless
accompanied by instruction in "creation science."' 45 Referring to the
"special context" of public elementary and secondary schools, Justice
Stevens emphasized that the Court has been "particularly vigilant" in
monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause because of the
school's special position of trust in the community.' The state enjoys
great authority, the Court declared, through mandatory attendance re-
quirements, coercive power of teachers who serve as role models, and
classmates who create peer pressure.'47 In this context, there must be
guarantees that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance
religious views.4s "'In no activity of. the State,'" the Court stressed, "'is
it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools.'"
49
As in Edwards, the. Court focused on "context" in Allegheny County
v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU."W In Allegheny, the public display of a
creche was held to violate the Establishment Clause, while the display
of a nearby menorah was not.'' The Court employed an "endorse-
soned, whereas in Zorach, that "symbolic union was conspicuously absent." Ball, 473
U.S. at 390-91.
143. Ball, 473 U.S. at 390. Thus, the Court spent a portion of the majority opinion
painstakingly examining the procedures of both programs, from courses offered to
whether religious symbols appeared in the classrooms and adjoining hallways where
courses were taught.. Id. at 375-79.
144. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
145. Id. at 582-83. For an extended discussion of the constitutional implications of
teaching or suppressing the teaching of creationism and evolution, see Gregory G.
Sarno & Alan Stephens, Annotation, Constitutionality of Teaching or Suppressing
Teaching of Biblical Creationism or Darwinian Evolution Theory in Public Schools,
102 A.L.R. FED. 537 (1992).
146. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583-84.
147. Id. at 584.
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U. S. 203, 231 (1948).
150: 492 U.S. 573 (1989). The Court referred to the Lemon test, but specified that it
had been "refined" in recent years to be an "endorsement" inquiry. Id. at 592. The
Court then proceeded to dissect the settings in which each holiday display appeared,
seeking signs of favoritism or disapproval toward religion ("the effect of a crche
display turns on its setting"). Id. at 593, 598.
151. Id. at 579. This controversial case attracted much attention. See Shahin Rezai,
ment/context" analysis, reasoning that because the creche appeared
with no surrounding "secularizing" symbols to mitigate the religious
message, the state was improperly involved in promoting a religious
activity.52 Secular symbols of the holiday season surrounded the me-
norah, on the other hand, and thus no message of endorsement exist-
ed." Justice Kennedy strongly disagreed with the Court's decision,
charging that it reflected "an unjustified hostility toward religion. " "
Similarly, the concept of "context" was again the cornerstone of the
Court's reasoning in Board of Educ. v. Mergens.'TM In Mergens, the
Court upheld the students' right to form a Christian club on campus,
reasoning that a message of governmental endorsement was unlikely,
since the club met after school hours, was voluntary, and required no
faculty participation."
Thus, in the years leading up to the case at hand, the Court has at-
tempted to shape an analytical formula that can be applied with consis-
Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment Clause
Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 503 (1990); Barbara S. Barrett, Religious Displays and
the First Amendment: County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 13
HARv. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 399 (1990); Gregory J. Blackburn, Comment, Government, the
Holiday Season, and the Establishment Clause: A Perspective on the Issues, 20
STETSON L. REv. 217 (1990); Richard A. Lacroix, Comment, County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union: How the Bench Stole Christmas, 25 NEw ENG. L. REV.
523 (1990); Jeffrey R. Wagener, Comment, A Survey of the Supreme Court's Approach
to the Establishment Clause in Light of County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liber-
ties Union, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 169 (1990); Keith 0. McArtor, Note and Comment, A
Conservative Struggles with Lemon: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's Dissent in Alle-
gheny, 26 TULSA L.J. 107 (1990); Matthew P. Kammerer, Note, County of Allegheny v.
A.C.L.U.: Perpetuating the Setting Factor Myth, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 933 (1990); George
M. Janoscko, Beyond the "Plastic Reindeer Rule": The Curious Case of County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 28 DUQ. . REV. 445 (1990); Christopher
S. Nesbit, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Justice O'Connor's Endorsement Test,
68 N.C. L REV. 590 (1990).
152. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602. "The government may acknowledge Christmas as a
cultural phenomenon, but under the First Amendment it may not observe it as a
Christian holy day . .. ." Id. at 601. For a discussion of the constitutional parame-
ters for the public display of religious symbols, see Gary D. Spivey, Annotation,
Erection, Maintenance, or Display of Religious Structures or Symbols on Public
Property as Violation of Religious Freedom, 36 A.L.R. 3D 1256 (1992).
153. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 618.
154. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "Rather than requiring government to avoid
any action that acknowledges or aids religion," Justice Kennedy stated, "the Estab-
lishment Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating
the central role religion plays in our society." Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
155. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
156. Id. at 249-52. See Timothy M. Gibbons, Note, The Equal Access Act and
Mergens: Balancing the Religion Clauses in Public Schools, 24 GA. L. REv. 1141
(1990) (examining the trend in public schools of excessive concern over the Estab-
lishment Clause).
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tency to Establishment Clause challenges. The wall has been raised and
lowered, theories have been tested and discarded, and the result has
been, as one social commentator put it, "incoherent."'67
F. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence in the Lower Courts
In analyzing Establishment Clause challenges, lower courts have, in
varying degrees, embraced Supreme Court precedents, questioned them
and, at times, ignored them entirely. For example, in Stein v. Plainwell
Community Schools, the Sixth Circuit upheld, in theory, the state's
power to use invocations and benedictions at public school graduation
ceremonies, even though the court found that the language of the
prayers in question violated the Establishment Clause. In reversing
the District Court decision, which upheld the prayers and relied heavily
on a Lemon analysis, the Sixth Circuit instead analogized the gradua-
tion prayers to the legislative prayers in Marsh v. Chambers." The
court clarified that the Marsh concept of the "equal liberty of con-
science" was the court's guiding principle.6 ' Like the "civil," ceremoni-
al prayers in Marsh, the court stated, graduation prayers in general
serve the same solemnizing function. Further, the court in Stein saw
157. Terry Eastland, Prayer and Psycho-Law, WASH. TIMES, June 26, 1992, at Fl.
For general analyses of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see Richard S. Myers,
The Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion, 41 CAT. U. L. REV. 19 (Fall
1991) (analyzing the privatization thesis and the flaws in restricting religion to an
explicitly private role); J. Woodford Howard, Jr. The Robe and the Cloth: The Su-
preme Court and Religion in the United States, 7 J.L & PoL 481 (Spring 1991)
(examining the Supreme Court's search for a manageable standard to resolve the di-
lemma of First Amendment analysis).
158. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987). The Plainwell public schools included benedic-
tions and invocations at their graduation ceremonies. The prayers were organized by
the students and delivered by either students or student-selected clergy. Id. at 1407.
159. The prayers included the phrases "Heavenly Father," "God," "0 Divine Master,
and "Christ our Lord," among others. Id. at 1407. However, in dicta, the court sug-
gested that these prayers would have been acceptable had they not contained these
explicitly religious references. Id. at 1410.
160. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
161. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1408. In the interests of "equal liberty of conscience ...we
have rejected the notion of a confessional state that supports religion in favor of a
neutral state designed to foster the most extensive liberty of conscience compatible
with a similar or equal liberty for others." Id.
162. Id. at 1409. Thus, the, court stated, "to prohibit entirely the tradition of invoca-
tions at graduation exercises while sanctioning the tradition of invocations for judg-
es,... does not appear to be a consistent application of the principle of equal
little danger of peer pressure, indoctrination, or coercion in the gradua-
tion ceremony." Rather, "the public nature of the proceeding and the
usual presence of parents act as a buffer against religious coercion.""
However, the California Supreme Court, in Sands v. Morongo Unified
School District," took to task the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Stein,
characterizing it as "an improper extension of Marsh."" The Supreme
Court "has taken particular care," the California court stated, "to ex-
plain that Marsh should not be applied to determine the constitu-
tionality of public school practices."67 Rather, the court in Morongo
applied the traditional Lemon test to find the graduation prayers at
issue violated the Establishment Clause.
However, in Griffith v. Teran, 9 a federal district court in Kansas
relied on Lemon to. find that an invocation and benediction for a high
school graduation ceremony did not violate the Establishment
Clause.70 In applying the Lemon test, the court weighed heavily that
the prayers, which referred to "Oh Mighty Lord" and "God," were to be
read by a student at the graduation ceremony, that attendance was not
mandatory, and that the ceremony was to be held at the local
convention center, instead of on campus. 7' The court interpreted the
liberty of conscience." Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. In addition, the court stated, the graduation prayers should be analyzed
under the Marsh standard because, although they. occurred in the school context, the
dynamics of a graduation ceremony are very different from those in a classroom
where the students are learning values from an authority figure. Id.
165. 53 Cal. 3d 863 (1991). At all four Morongo public high schools, invocations and
benedictions are delivered at the graduation ceremonies. Student-selected and school-
approved clergy deliver the prayers, all of which contain explicitly religious language.
Id. at 868-69.
166. Id. at 882.
167. Id. at 881. Nevertheless, in a concurring opinion, the Chief Justice insisted on
a broader reading of Marsh v. Chambers, refusing to isolate Marsh "as an aberration
in the mainstream of constitutional decisionmaking." Id. at 901 (Lucas, C.J., concur-
ring). The Chief Justice claimed that the famous footnote 4 in Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987), has been misread to limit Marsh to legislative prayer.
Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 898-99 (Lucas, C.J., concurring). In fact, Marsh has been "inte-
grated into the analysis" of key Establishment Clause opinions. Id. at 900 (Lucas,
C.J., concurring).
168. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 881.
169. 794 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Kan. 1992). In Teran, the prayers at the high school
graduation ceremony were delivered by students. School officials approved the
prayers and required that they be nonsectarian. Id. at 1055.
170. Id. at 1058-59.
171. Id. at 1055, 1057. The court perceived a "clear and meaningful distinction"
between prayer in the classroom, where families entrust the education of their chil-
dren, and at a graduation ceremony, where neither attendance nor education is
compulsory. Id. at 1057.
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first prong of Lemon to require some secular purpose, but not that the
purpose be only secular, and thus found the school's aim of "solemniz-
ing public occasions" to be a valid secular purpose.17 The court also
found that the nonsectarian prayers did not have the primary effect of
advancing religion in the context of a graduation ceremony.73 Since a
student was to deliver the prayers, and the principal's only function was
to review them beforehand, the court found no excessive entangle-
ment.17 The court dismissed the possibility of a coercion component,'
stating that the parents' presence "may be expected to mitigate any
'coercive power' that might otherwise be present."75 Although the
court acknowledged that the Supreme Court did not intend for the
Marsh decision to be extended to the school setting, it still likened the
graduation prayers to the legislative prayer upheld in Marsh, rather
than to the impermissible religious conduct in the traditional "prayer-in-
school" cases."
Thus, lower courts have attempted to shape their own analytical
mechanisms for Establishment Clause analysis, while recognizing, as.
the Morongo court put it, that "bright and immutable lines and rigid,
absolute views are out of place in this area of the law."'77 This further
172. Id. at 1058-59.
173. Id. at 1059. Rather, the court held, referring to the Supreme Court's creche
cases, "the state may associate itself even with symbols that are unmistakably reli-
gious if the context of the association does not endorse religion." Id.
174. Teran, 794 F. Supp at 1059.
175. Id. at 1057.
176. Id. at 1058. See also Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th
Cir. 1991) (emphasizing that the Lemon test, not Marsh reasoning, should be applied
in school-related Establishment Clause challenges); Albright v. Board of Educ., 765 F.
Supp. 682 (D. Utah 1991) (applying both Lemon and Marsh to uphold the graduation
prayers, while trying to second-guess the Supreme Court's preference).
177. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 886 (1991). In non-prayer
cases, as well, the courts have wrestled with Supreme Court precedents to arrive at
an analytical formula for Establishment Clause challenges. See Barnes v. Cavazos,
966 F.2d 1056, 1063, 1065-66 (6th Cir. 1992) (professing "confusion and frustration
with Lemon's analytical framework," yet using Lemon, along with a so-called "grossly
disproportionate test," to uphold allocating education funds to private schools); Otero
v. State Election Bd., 975 F.2d 738 (10th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging the criticism
aimed at the Lemon test, but exercising all three prongs of it to uphold the use of
churches as polling places); Americans United for Separation of Church and State v.
City of Grand Rapids, 1992 WL 77643 (6th Cir. 1992) (using Lemon test, endorsement
test, and "context/composition/location" test to prohibit display of menorah in public
square); Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F. 2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991) (using a full Lemon
analysis to uphold a statute declaring Good Friday a state holiday); Murray v. City of
underscores the need for guidance in this area of the law, which the
Weisman Court did not provide.
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
Lee v. Weisman"8 challenged the constitutionality of non-denomina-
tional prayers at public school graduation ceremonies. Deborah
Weisman graduated from Providence, Rhode Island's Nathan Bishop
Middle School on June 29, 1989." It was the policy of Providence
school district officials to allow principals to invite members of the
clergy to offer invocations and benedictions at middle and high school
graduation ceremonies.'" Deborah's principal, Robert E. Lee, invited
Rabbi Leslie Gutterman to deliver prayers at Deborah's graduation cere-
mony, and the rabbi accepted.'1 As was the custom among Provi-
dence school officials, the rabbi was given a pamphlet entitled "Guide-
lines for Civic Occasions," prepared by the National Conference of
Christians and Jews. The principal advised the rabbi that his prayers
should be nonsectarian, as did the "Guidelines" pamphlet."
Four days before Deborah's graduation ceremony, Daniel Weisman,
Deborah's father,'" sought a temporary restraining order in the United
States District Court for the District of Rhode Island to prohibit prayers
Austin, 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that city insignia bearing Christian
cross passed Lemon test); Southside Fair Hous. Comm. v. City of N.Y., 928 F.2d 1336
(2d Cir. 1991) (focusing on endorsement test to find that city's sale of land to Hasid-
ic congregation was not an establishment of religion); Doe v. City of Clawson, 915
F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1990) (relying on the endorsement test elaborated in Allegheny
-County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU to permit a nativity display on the front lawn of
city hall); Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying all three prongs
of Lemon to hold that the county's ownership and maintenance of a park displaying
religious statuary did not violate the Establishment Clause); Garnett v. Renton Sch.
Dist., 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that student religious group meetings in
public school classrooms before hours could not pass Lemon test muster); Friedman
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (concluding that county
seal bearing a cross and the motto "With This We Conquer" could not pass Lemon
test, although acknowledging that Lemon was not the "be-all" and "end-all" in Es-
tablishment Clause cases); Carpenter v. City of S.F., 966 F.2d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
(refusing to apply Lemon rigidly and allowing display of cross in public park).
178. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
179. Id. at 2653.
180. Id. at 2652.
181. Id.
182. Id. The pamphlet recommended that the prayers be composed with "sensitiv-
ity," and acknowledged that at certain civic events, prayers of any kind may be
inappropriate. Id.
183. Daniel Weisman brought the suit as a Providence taxpayer and as next friend
of Deborah. Id. at 2654.
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from being included in the graduation ceremony." The court denied
the motion, citing a lack of time to consider it." Deborah and her
family attended the graduation ceremony, where the students stood dur-
ing both the rabbi's prayers and the Pledge of Allegiance."
In July 1989, Daniel Weisman filed an amended complaint seeking a
permanent injunction to bar school district officials from inviting clergy
to offer prayers at future graduation ceremonies. 7 The district court
held that including prayers at public school graduations suggested a
governmental endorsement of religion and, thus, violated the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment.' On appeal, the United States
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 2653. Rabbi Gutterman's recited the following prayers:
INVOCATION
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of mi-
norities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women grow
up to enrich it.
For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow up
to guard it.
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate,
for its court system where all may seek justice we thank You. May those we
honor this morning always turn to it in trust.
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bish-
op Middle School so live that they might help to share it.
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are our
hope for the future, be richly fulfilled. AMEN
BENEDICTION
O God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for
learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement.
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important
milestone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who
helped prepare them.
The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future, help them to
understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We
must each strive to fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love
mercy, to walk humbly.
We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and allowing
us to reach this special, happy occasion. AMEN
Id. at 2652-53.
187. Id. at 2654.
188. Id. The district court applied the three-pronged Lemon test and found that the
state's practice violated the second prong of the test, which requires that a state
practice neither advance nor inhibit religion. The district court did not address either
the first or the third prong of the test. Id.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.'" The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether inclusion of
prayers in public school graduation ceremonies is consistent with the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.'"
IV. ANALYSIS OF. THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
At the outset of the Court's opinion, Justice Kennedy.9' laid the
ground rules: Lemon v. Kurtzman.2 would not be reconsidered, and
the "difficult questions" dividing the Court leading up to Weisman
would not be revisited."n Rather, Justice Kennedy proclaimed; "con-
trolling precedents" compel the holding that the graduation prayers are
unconstitutional.' 4 Justice Kennedy identified the two "dominant
facts" that dictated the Court's ruling: (1) state officials directed the
performance of a religious exercise at a public school graduation cere-
mony , and (2) students were compelled to attend.'9"
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2655.
191. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter joined Justice Kennedy in
the majority opinion. Id. at 2652.
192. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
193. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. Justice Kennedy's opening statement signaled the
controversy that the Court's opinion would create. Where the lower court in
Weisman relied heavily on the Lemon analysis to find the graduation prayers uncon-
stitutional, Justice Kennedy dismissed Lemon almost entirely. Justice Kennedy referred
to Lemon in his recitation of Weisman's lower court history, but emphasized that
this Court's decision rests on "the controlling precedents" in prior prayer-in-school
cases, not on a traditional Lemon analysis. Id. Lemon would not be revisited, the
Justice declared, nor would it be reconsidered. Id. (Three years earlier, Justice Ken-
nedy had already postponed a reconsideration of the Lemon test. In Allegheny County
v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), Justice Kennedy, in his dissenting
opinion, acknowledged the "persuasive criticism" against Lemon, but declined to act
on it at that time: "Substantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be
in order, but it is unnecessary to undertake that task today." Id. at 656 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).) However, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion did not speak for the
majority regarding Lemon. The four justices that joined in the Court's opinion each
wrote separately and, to varying degrees, expressed support for Lemon. Weisman, 112
S. Ct. at 2661-86.
194. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. Justice Kennedy declared that Weisman could be
decided "without reconsidering the general constitutional framework," or, in other
words, without applying the conventional analytical formulas, because the decision is
so solidly rooted in history. Id. Yet, Justices Blackmun and Souter, in their concur-
ring opinions, relied on history to support slightly different views than Justice Kenne-
dy, id. at 2661-78 (Blackmun and Souter, J.J., concurring), and Justice Scalia, in his
dissenting opinion, historically supported a view entirely at odds with the majority
opinion. Id. at 2678-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 2655. Justice Kennedy's opinion contrasts markedly with the separate
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1. State Involvement in a Religious Exercise
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated unequivocally that,
in the case at hand, the government's involvement with a religious ac-
tivity was "pervasive, to the point of creating a state-sponsored and
state-directed religious exercise in a public school."'" At a minimum,
the majority declared, the First Amendment guarantees that this will
not be permitted.'97
opinion he delivered three years earlier in Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), in which he argued that the
display of a creche was consistent with the constitutional objective of the Establish-
ment Clause. Id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy argued against
casting the Court in the role of "jealous guardians of an absolute 'wall of separa-
tion.'" Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Rather, rejecting the Court's endorsement test,
Justice Kennedy proposed a "proselytization" test, which would prohibit state efforts
to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion. Id. at 661 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
In describing what would constitute proselytization, Justice Kennedy used words like
"permanent," "year-round," and "continual," and characterized the creche as "no realis-
tic risk" for proselytization. Id. at 664 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Rather, Justice Ken-
nedy argued, displaying the creche is an "accommodation" of religion. Id. (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). (However, the majority disagreed, stating that government can accom-
modate religion only when there exists an identifiable burden on the free exercise of
religion. Id. at 613 n.59). In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy also introduced "coercion" as
a necessary element for an Establishment Clause violation, but stated that where the
coercion is not direct, it must be of such a degree that it actually establishes a reli-
gion. Id. at 662 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Otherwise, there is no "realistic risk" of
impermissible establishment. Id. at 662 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). It is curious that
Justice Kennedy abandoned the proselytization test in Weisman in favor of a "psycho-
logical coercion" test. Had the proselytization test alone been applied in Weisman, it
seems unlikely that the graduation prayers would have been improper, since they
occurred only once yearly, were nonsectarian and, the coercion argument aside,
attendance was voluntary.
196. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
197. Id. However, Justice Kennedy launched into his argument against an establish-
ment of religion without defining just what "religion" means in a constitutional sense.
This core issue has provoked decades of scholarly debate and has yet to be resolved.
See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrIrIONAL LAW § 14-6 (1978) (proposing
that, for Establishment Clause analysis, any conduct that is "arguably non-religious"
should not be considered impermissible); Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the
First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579 (1982) (suggesting that the legal definition
of religion should not be abstract or esoteric, but rather "specific and understandable
to produce fair and uniform results"); George C. Freeman, The Misguided Search for
the Constitutional Definition of "Religion," 71 GEo. LJ. 1519 (1983) (arguing that,
because religion cannot be defined, the courts need only agree on a "standard of
meaning of religion"); Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amend-
ment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L REV. 817 (1984) (concluding that no constitution-
Justice Kennedy clarified what the Court considered to be the "perva-
sive involvement" of the school officials that drew the state into its
improper role in the graduation ceremony.'" The principal's decision
to include an invocation and benediction in the graduation became the
state's decision, Justice Kennedy declared, and for all intents, the per-
ception was "as if a state statute decreed that the prayers must oc-
cur."" Also attributable to the state was the principal's selection of a
rabbi to officiate,' and, even more troubling for the Court, the
al definition of religion is possible); Paul J. Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality: The
Establishment of Secularism in the Public Schools, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REv. 177 (1979)
(proposing an all-encompassing definition of religion as "any belief system," and
suggesting that the courts prohibit the state from the establishment or suppression of
any viable religious construct); Note, Toward A Constitutional Definition of Religion,
91 HARv. L. REV. 1056 (1978) (providing a historical overview of the Court's approach
to defining religion).
198. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655-57. Laurence Tribe insists that "[slecular tools will
almost always suffice to pursue government's interests." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1285 (2d ed. 1988). Tribe lists seven dangers likely to occur
when the government employs religious tools unnecessarily that Justice Kennedy
could have used as a checklist in Weisman: (1) the government makes religious
choices; (2) in doing so, the government likely violates denominational neutrality; (3)
in trying to achieve neutrality, administrative entanglement results; (4) the government
endorses religion; (5) the religion itself becomes secularized; (6) the government puts
itself on a religious pedestal; and (7) the government sends a message of exclusion
to non-adherents. Id. at 1286-87.
199. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. Justice Kennedy did not object to similar state
involvement when he relied on Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), to support
his argument in Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). In
Marsh, the Court upheld legislative prayers in which the state involvement exceeded
that in Weisman. The legislature in Marsh not only selected the clergy member (who
had been delivering their opening prayers for sixteen consecutive years), but the clergy-
man was paid out of state funds. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 785. Justice Kennedy supported
the Court's decision on the basis that the prayers had become a part of the fabric of
society. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2660-61. Yet, as Justice Scalia pointed out, prayer at
public school ceremonies is a tradition as deeply rooted as inaugural prayers,
Thanksgiving prayers and prayers in the legislature (notwithstanding Justice
O'Connor's contention to the contrary, see supra note 127). Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at
2679-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting). More importantly, the state's involvement in those
ceremonial prayers is no less than in the case at hand. Thus, it appears that, based
on past Court decisions, Justice Kennedy's claim of improper state involvement can-
not stand alone to constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause. Its viability
depends on the viability of the Court's central argument, that the state psychological-
ly coerced participation in a religious exercise.
200. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. The reason for the choice of a rabbi is not on
the record, but the record does suggest that the principals are free to invite clergy of
any denomination. Id. at 2652. In an interview subsequent to the announcement of
the Court's decision, Mr. Weisman indicated that he had attended an earlier gradu-
ation ceremony in which a prayer to Jesus Christ was offered. Ban on School Prayer
is Upheld; Court Stuns Conservatives by Reinforcing Church-State Split, STAR TRIB.,
June 25, 1992, at IA.
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principal's advice about the contents of the prayer accompanied by the
"Guidelines" pamphlet."l Through these means, the principal, and by
extension, the state, controlled and directed the content of the
prayer,'m thereby violating a cornerstone principle of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence: that "it is no part of the business of government
to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to
recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government. "2'
The Court then addressed the argument that a "civic religion" had
emerged in the country, a phenomenon in which religion had been sec-
ularized into nondenominational prayers, acceptable to all.' Acknowl-
201. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2656.
202. Id. The Court's strong opposition to the principal's advice and the guidelines'
suggestions would seem more reasonable if both were encouraging a-sectarian mes-
sage. As it is, the Court acknowledged that both the advice and the pamphlet were
merely good-faith efforts to ensure a nonsectarian message. Id.
203. Id. (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962)). In Engel, however, the
state had actually written the prayers that the public school system adopted. Engel,
370 U.S. at 423. In the case at hand, there is nothing on the record to indicate that
the principal even saw the prayers before they were delivered.
204. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2656. Justice Kennedy dismisses in a few sentences a
provocative analytical theory that is currently enjoying attention from legal scholars.
Yehudah Mirsky, in Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE LJ. 1237
(1986), explains that civil, or civic, religion is a secular phenomenon in which society
"hallows" its political life, expressing its most abiding values and ideals. Id. at 1238-
39.
By developing and nurturing civil religions the members of modem societies
attempt to recapture some of the lost, organic solidarity of pre-moder soci-
eties by linking political ideas . . . with a network of hallowed meanings. By
so doing, a society can link its political ideas and institutions to its basic,
heartfelt sentiments and aspirations.
Id. at 1250. American civil religion, Mirsky claims, developed to fill the gap left by the
demise of the established church as a means by which people could express social
cohesiveness. Id. at 1251. If the Court understood the role of civil religion in American
life, Mirsky explains, the Court would no longer mistake civil religion for its traditional,
sacral counterpart. Id. at 1255. Of note, Justice Scalia, in his dissent, underscored the
virtue of prayer in terms very similar to Mirsky's, characterizing it as an "important
unifying mechanism" and "characteristically American." Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2686
(Scalia, J., dissenting). For related arguments for and against civil religion, see Michael
W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992) ("A
scrupulous secularism in all aspects of public life touched by government . . . warded
off the dangers of majoritarian religion, but it exacerbated the equal and opposite dan-
ger of majoritarian indifference or intolerance toward religion."); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195 (1992) ("The negative bar
against establishment of religion implies the affirmative 'establishment' of a civil order
for the resolution of public moral disputes."); Sanford Levinson, Religious Language
edging that there may be some empirical support for this argument,
Justice Kennedy emphasized that although the pursuit of a common
moral and ethical ground between all societies might be worthwhile,
the First Amendment prohibits government from undertaking that task
itself. Furthermore, the Court declared, measured against Establishment
Clause standards of neutrality in which "all creeds must be tolerated
and none favored," endorsing a civic religion is "a contradiction that
cannot be accepted."'
2. State Coercion of Participation in a Religious Exercise'
Justice Kennedy devoted a major portion of the Court's opinion to an
analysis of the dynamics of the school environment and the Court's
heightened interest in protecting the students' "freedom of conscience"
in this context.' At the outset, the Court rejected the argument that
the graduation prayers were "speech" to be endured by the students in
much the same way that any other objectionable idea should be tolerat-
ed in a free society.'°7 Rather, the Court emphasized, "The First Amend-
ment protects speech and religion by quite different mechanisms." '
The government protects speech by ensuring its open expression and
may ultimately even participate in this process if it happens that the
speech persuades government to adopt an idea as its own. The
government's method for protecting freedom of religion is "quite the
and the Public Square, 105 HARv. L. REV. 2061 (1992) (book review) ("To force the
religious to speak solely in the language of the secular is to impose a uniformity of
discourse that demeans those whose 'native language' includes a deeply religious vo-
cabulary.").
205. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2657.
206. Id. The Court's psychological coercion argument is vulnerable to attack be-
cause it is based on the premise that the Court has successfully read the minds of
the students involved. Instead, the Court might have more effectively used the en-
dorsement test that Justice O'Connor introduced in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984), and elaborated upon in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). Although there
are apparent dissimilarities, the Court may have analogized the graduation benedic-
tion, with its on-campus ceremony in which faculty and students participated, to
Wallace's classroom situation, especially in light of the Court's heightened concern for
Establishment Clause abuse in schools. Also, inasmuch as the endorsement test uses
an objective standard to measure questionable state practices, the Court could have
avoided entering a realm where, as Justice Scalia said, it had no right to be.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2657.
208. Id. The Court distinguished between the protections guaranteed in the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. While "[t]he Free Exercise Clause
embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that has close parallels in the speech
provisions of the First Amendment," the Establishment Clause specifically prohibits
state involvement in religious affairs with "no precise counterpart in the speech pro-
visions." Id.
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reverse," because the Establishment Clause specifically forbids state
involvement in religion. The Court further explained that the difference
lies in the lesson of history that inspired the Establishment Clause.'
This "timeless lesson,", Justice Kennedy stated, teaches that religious
establishment is antithetical to the freedom of all, because that which
begins as government's tolerant expression of religious views might end
in enforced indoctrination. State-sponsored religion, Justice Kennedy
warned, means that the state has turned its back on its "duty to guard
and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief which is the
mark of a free people."21 The Court stressed that the lessons of histo-
ry are no less urgent now than in the 18th Century when the framers of
the First Amendment sought to protect their religious freedom in the
New World.21" '
Justice Kennedy then turned to the Court's central argument: the
"undeniable fact" that the state coerced students into participating in a
religious ceremony. Referring to past prayer-in-school cases,"2 Justice
Kennedy emphasized that prayer in public schools carries a particular
risk of indirect coercion that can be as real to an impressionable stu-
dent as any overt compulsion.2"3 For the students in Weisman, the
graduation prayers bore the imprint of the state, Justice Kennedy
claimed. As such, the state created public pressure, as well as peer
pressure, for the students to stand as a group or, at least, remain re-
spectfully silent during the prayers."4 Justice Kennedy believed that
209. Id. at 2658. However, just three years earlier, Justice Kennedy argued that
Marsh had already legitimated all "practices with no greater potential for an estab-
lishment of religion" than those "accepted traditions dating back to the Founding."
Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 602 (1989).
210. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658. Justice Kennedy concluded that the preservation
and transmission of religious worship is properly committed to "the private sphere."
Id. at 2656. Yet, later in the opinion, the Justice acknowledged the soundness of the
Marsh decision upholding prayers in the legislature, prayers that are decidedly not in
the private sphere. Id. at 2658.
211. Id.
212. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962). Although the prayer-in-school cases bear some resemblance to the case at
hand-both involve a school environment, students and faculty-the dissimilarities are
more striking. For example, in Weisman, the prayers did not occur in a classroom
where the students' presence was legally compelled, neither a teacher nor a student
read the prayers, and the students' behavior was not monitored as it would be in a
classroom.
213. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
214. Id. Justice Kennedy acknowledged that in a non-school context, standing during
either of these options would be perceived by the students as par-
ticipation in the prayer."' Furthermore, the Court stated, the "embar-
rassment and the intrusion of the religious exercise" cannot be refuted
by claims that the prayers were nonsectarian or of a de minimis char-
acter, or in the alternative, that the prayers were essential to the cere-
mony.
216
The Court dismissed as "formalistic" the claim that attendance at
graduation ceremonies was voluntary and, thus, not coercive.1 7 Char-
acterizing high school graduation as "one of life's most significant occa-
sions," Justice Kennedy declared that it is "apparent" a student is not
free to absent herself from a ceremony that embraces her school years,
her aspirations, her family, and her friends.2"' In no real sense, the
Court claimed, can a student voluntarily forfeit "those intangible bene-
fits which have motivated the student through youth and all her high
school years."2"9 To require her to do so, the Court stated, "turns con-
ventional First Amendment analysis on its head," since "[i]t is a tenet of
the First Amendment that the State cannot require one of its citizens to
forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting confor-
mance to state-sponsored religious practice."
220
It is the component of psychological coercion, Justice Kennedy ex-
plained, that distinguished Weisman from an earlier case, Marsh v.
a prayer would probably be nothing more than "a reasonable request" that the nonbe-
liever respect the differing religious practices. However, in a school context such as
in the case at hand, the request may appear to the nonbeliever "to be an attempt to
employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy." Id.
215. Id. Thus, without explanation, Justice Kennedy dismissed the possibility that a
student could actually stand during the prayer merely as a sign of respect and not as
means of participation. The Justice claimed that standing is "no doubt" an expression
of participation and relied on "[rlesearch in psychology" to support this contention.
Id. at 2659.
216. Id. at 2659-60. That the prayers were nonsectarian, Justice Kennedy claimed,
does not lessen the sense of isolation a nonbeliever might have felt. In addition,
characterizing the prayers as de minimis is insulting to the Rabbi who delivered
them, the Justice stated, and claiming they are essential to a graduation ceremony
does not justify state-enforced religious conformity. Id.
217. Id. at 2659. Petitioner's central argument was that because the graduation exer-
cises were voluntary, no inducement or coercion in the ceremony itself could exist.
218. Id. "To say that a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her high
school graduation is formalistic in the extreme .... A school rule which excuses
attendance is beside the point." Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2660. Justice Kennedy compared Weisman to the classroom prayer cases,
emphasizing that simply making the classroom prayers voluntary did not shield them
from invalidation. In the same way, the Justice stated, the voluntary nature of the
graduation does not remove the risk of state-compelled participation. Id.
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Chambers,"i in which the Court held that prayer at the opening of a
legislative session did not violate the First Amendment." There, the
Court reasoned, adults are free to come and go in a much less formal
atmosphere, unlike the "constraining potential" of the one event most
important to the student, her graduation ceremony.'
Justice Kennedy concluded the Court's opinion by acknowledging
that Establishment Clause jurisprudence remained "delicate and fact
sensitive." 4 Every state action involving religion, Justice Kennedy de-
clared, does not necessarily offend the First Amendment. "Our jurispru-
dence in this area is of necessity one of line drawing,.. . but the mea-
sure of constitutional adjudication is the ability and willingness to dis-
tinguish between real threat and mere shadow." '
221. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
222. The difference between Marsh and Weisman, according to Justice Kennedy,
lies in the facts of each case. At Weisman's graduation, "teachers and principals must
and do retain a high degree of control over the precise contents of the program, the
speeches, the timing, the movements, the dress, and the decorum of the students." In
Marsh's congressional halls, however, adults, not impressionable students, "are free to
enter and leave." The atmosphere lacks "the influence and force of a formal exer-
cise." Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2660-61.
223. Id. at 2660.
224. Id. at 2661. Yet in Allegheny, Justice Kennedy attacked the "endorsement test"
as being a "jurisprudence of minutiae" because it employed a fact-sensitive approach.
Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674 (1989). The majority
in Allegheny warned Justice Kennedy that "he should be wary of accusing the Court's
formulation as 'using little more than intuition and a tape measure,'" when his own
"proselytization" test might be "convicted on an identical charge." Id. at 608.
225. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2661 (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)). However, Justice Kennedy did not really
clarify how to distinguish between "threat" and "shadow" stating:
The First Amendment does not prohibit practices which by any realistic mea-
sure create none of the dangers which it is designed to prevent and which
do not so directly or substantially involve the state in religious exercises or
in the favoring of religion as to have meaningful and practical impact.
Id. (emphasis added). However, these latest terms do not enable the Court to "draw
lines" with any more certainty than the Court has in the past 50 years of Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence.
B. Justice Blackmun's Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun"6 examined over a cen-
tury of state and federal Establishment Clause jurisprudence and found
that the Court had nothing short of a mandate to reach the decision
that it did." Justice Blackmun distilled the laundry list of Establish-
ment Clause "don'ts" first enumerated in Everson to one clear principle:
"Government may neither promote nor affiliate itself with any religious
doctrine or organization, nor may it obtrude itself in the internal affairs
of any religious institution." ' Since 1971, Justice Blackmun continued,
the Court has relied on the Lemon test to weigh the merits of state
legislation in relation to this principle.229 According to Justice
Blackmun, a straightforward application of Lemon reveals that "there
can be no doubt that the government is advancing and promoting reli-
gion. " ' Relying on the Court's language in Engel v. Vitale," Justice
Blackmun stated that the Rabbi's prayer at Weisman's graduation cere-
mony clearly was "'a religious activity,' ..... a solemn avowal of divine
faith and supplication for the blessings of the Almighty. ' 2 The gov-
ernment placed its "official stamp of approval" on this prayer,
Blackmun declared, when it planned and supervised the graduation
226. Id. at 2661 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
227. Id. at 2661-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
228. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Thus, in the same way that Justices Kennedy,
Souter and Scalia grounded their opinions in history, Justice Blackmun also supported
his separationist approach with a survey of over 100 years of Supreme Court juris-
prudence. In particular, Justice Blackmun referred to several late nineteenth and early
twentieth century cases, including Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879)
(identifying Jefferson's "wall of separation" as the proper standard of Establishment
Clause analysis) and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (prohibiting legislation
supporting any religion), along with the modern Establishment Clause cases prohibit-
ing prayer in school.
229. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2663 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In spite of the fact
that Lemon was conspicuously absent from Weisman's majority opinion, Justice
Blackmun stressed in his own opinion that "[i]n no case involving religious activities
in public schools has the Court failed to apply vigorously the Lemon factors." Id. at
2663 n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 2664 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Having said this, however, Justice
Blackmun's application of the Lemon test was less than straightforward. Thus, al-
though Justice Blackmun did not specify precisely, it can only be assumed that the
"purpose" prong was violated by the inherent religious nature of the prayer, and the
government's "stamp of approval" violated the "effects" prong. Justice Blackmun did
refer to the entanglement prong of the Lemon test in a footnote, but it is unclear
what conduct in Weisman he considered violative. Id. at 2663 n.3.
231. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
232. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2664 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Engel, 370
U.S. at 424). Justice Blackmun cited the Book of the Prophet Micah, chapter 6, verse
8 as the source of a portion of the Rabbi's prayer, which the Justice labeled as
being within the Judeo-Christian tradition. Id. n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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ceremony and pressured students to attend.' However, Justice
Blackmun stressed that although coercion is not a necessary compo-
nent of an Establishment Clause violation, where it is present, it is
sufficient.'m "But it is not enough," Blackmun stated, "that the govern-
ment restrain from compelling religious practices: it must not engage in
them either. " '
Justice Blackmun emphatically warned of the peril of a government
engaged in religion, claiming that "'[a]nguish, hardship and bitter strife'
result 'when zealous religious groups struggl[e] with one another to
obtain the Government's stamp of approval."'' He cautioned that gov-
ernment "abandons its obligation as guarantor of democracy" when it
"arrogates to itself a role in religious affairs." 7 Democratic govern-
ment will not endure, Justice Blackmun stated, "when proclamation
replaces persuasion as the medium of political exchange."' Justice
233. Id. at 2664 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
234. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Whereas a coercion analysis was the corner-
stone of the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun cited several cases dismissing coer-
cion as a predicate for an Establishment Clause violation. Rather, Justice Blackmun
emphasized that past decisions have "turned only on the fact that the government
was sponsoring a manifestly religious exercise." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973)). At one point, while
reducing the coercion component to a mere footnote, Justice Blaclanun conceded
that "[a]s a practical matter, of course, anytime the government endorses a religious
belief there will almost always be some pressure to conform." Id. at 2664 n.6
(Blackmun, J., concurring). But the Justice refused to confine Establishment Clause
analysis to such a constrained scope: "'[Tihe fullest possible scope of religious liberty'
entails more than freedom from coercion. The Establishment Clause protects religious
liberty on a grand scale." Id. at 2665 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Abington
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963)).
235. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2664 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
236. Id. at 2665 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
429 (1962)). Relying on a different brand of psychological research than Justice
Kennedy did in the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun quoted Freud: "[A] religion,
even if it calls itself the religion of love, must be hard and unloving to those who do
not belong to it." Id. at 2666 n.10 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing SIGMUND FREUD,
GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO 51 (1922)).
237. Id. at 2666 (Blaclanun, J., concurring). "Democracy requires the nourishment of
dialogue and dissent, while religious faith puts its trust in an ultimate divine authority
above all human deliberation. When the government appropriates religious truth, it
'transforms rational debate into theological decree.'" Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(quoting Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Note, The Free Exercise Boundaries of Permis-
sible Accommodation Under the Establishment Clause, 99 YALE L.J. 1127, 1131
(1990)).
238. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). "Democratic government will not last long when
Blackmun underscored James Madison's early warning that a govern-
ment that controls religion is a tyrant and the people forced to submit
to it are slaves.' Government-forced support of religion, Justice
Blackmun pronounced, referring once again to a warning to the people
from Madison, differs only in degrees from the Inquisition itself. "The
one is the first step, the other the last in the career of intolerance."2"
C. Justice Souter's Concurring Opinion
Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion"' to resolve two specific
Establishment Clause issues: (1) whether the Clause applies to govern-
mental practices that are non-denominational, and (2) whether govern-
ment coercion is a necessary element of an Establishment Clause viola-
tion.242
Addressing the first issue, Justice Souter emphatically stated at the
outset that the Establishment Clause prohibits state-sponsored school
prayers even if those prayers are nondenominational.24" Referring to
this principle as "settled law," Justice Souter traced a fifty-year line of
precedent, beginning with Everson, from which he did not find a com-
pelling reason to depart.' This precedent is firmly rooted in the histo-
ry of the Establishment Clause," 5 Justice Souter stated, and he elabo-
rated at length on the textual evolution of the Clause from the first
draft to its final formulation as proof of the framers' intent that the
Establishment Clause prohibits nonpreferential.40 support of reli-
proclamation replaces persuasion as the medium of political exchange." Id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
239. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
240. Id. 2666 n.10 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
241. Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined in the opinion.
242. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2667 (Souter, J., concurring).
243. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
244. Id. at 2668. (Souter, J., concurring). As Justices Kennedy, Blackmun and Scalia
had done in their opinions, Justice Souter grounded his own argument on history,
tradition and precedent. However, Justice Souter built the broadest historical base of
the three on which to argue that "history neither contradicts nor warrants reconsid-
eration of the settled principle that the Establishment Clause forbids support for reli-
gion in general no less than support for one religion or some." Id. at 2670 (Souter,
J., concurring).
245. Justice Souter claimed that it is this history of the Clause's textual develop-
ment that provides the most powerful argument that the Clause does, in fact, prohibit
both preferential and non-preferential aid to religion. Id. at 2668 (Souter, J., concur-
ring).
246. Justice Souter alluded to the prickly issue of what constitutes nonpreferential
support, when at the same time that the framers were drafting the Establishment
Clause, ceremonial prayers were routinely heard in the halls of Congress and in pres-
idential messages. Referring to these ceremonial proclamations as "at worst trivial
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gion.247 To suggest otherwise, Justice Souter declared, would be to
breaches of the Establishment Clause," id. at 2670 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring), Justice
Souter seemed to suggest that there was no distinction to be made between sectarian
prayers, which would violate the Establishment Clause, and prayers that some consid-
ered "ecumenical enough to pass Establishment Clause muster." Id. at 2671 (Souter,
J., concurring). It is not the Court's province, Justice Souter stated, to indulge in this
type of comparative theology. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Thus, where Justice Kenne-
dy in the majority opinion condoned legislative prayers, finding no Establishment
Clause violation based on the non-school context in which they were given, Justice
Souter would likely find these prayers to be a violation of the Establishment Clause,
albeit a "trivial" violation. "[R]eligious invocations in Thanksgiving Day addresses and
the like, rarely noticed, ignored without effort, conveyed over an impersonal medium,
and directed at no one in particular, inhabit a pallid zone worlds apart from official
prayers delivered to a captive audience of public school students and their families.
Madison himself respected the difference between the trivial and the serious in con-
stitutional practice." Id. at 2678 (Souter, J., concurring).
247. Id. at 2668-70 (Souter, J., concurring). James Madison's draft of the Establish-
ment Clause presented at the First Congress in 1789 read: "The civil rights of none
shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national
religion be established, nor shall the' full and equal rights of conscience be in any
manner, or on any pretext, infringed." Id. at 2668 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing 1 AN-
NALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)). A House select committee edited it to
read that "no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of con-
science be infringed." Id. (Souter, J., concurring). The House rejected the select
committee's language, which ensured only that "no religion" could be preferred over
others, broadening it to read: "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or
infringing the rights of conscience." Id. at 2669 (Souter, J., concurring). The House
then narrowed this language and forwarded to the Senate a version that prohibited
laws establishing religion in general, reading: "Congress shall make no law establish-
ing Religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of con-
science be infringed." Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (citing 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 136 (Senate Journal)
(L de Pauw ed. 1972)). The Senate edited the House version to return to a prohibi-
tion of preferential support only, but ultimately drafted a broader proposal, reading:
"Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or
prohibiting the free exercise of religion." Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (citing 1 DOC-
UMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMER-
ICA 166 (Senate Journal) (L. de Pauw ed. 1972)). The House rejected this version and
convinced the Senate to adopt the final version as it now appears in the First
Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Id. (Souter, J., concurring). What is remarkable
in this textual evolution, Justice Souter stated, is that "unlike the earliest House
drafts or the final Senate proposal, the prevailing language is not limited to laws
respecting an establishment of 'a religion,' 'a national religion,' 'one religious sect,' or
specific 'articles of faith.' Id. (Souter, J., concurring). The framers repeatedly consid-
ered and deliberately rejected such narrow language and instead extended their
prohibition to state support for 'religion' in general." Id. at 2669-70 (Souter, J., con-
suggest that the framers were "extraordinarily bad drafters."' 4s
Addressing the second issue, Justice Souter departed from the
majority's heavy reliance on a coercion analysis to declare that coercion
is not a necessary component of an Establishment Clause violation.249
Acknowledging that the language of the Establishment Clause "is not
pellucid,"2" Justice Souter emphasized that in spite of this, the framers
had always intended,2"' and the Court had always read, the Clause to
ban more than merely a coercive establishment of religion.252 Rather,
the Justice stated, although "the Establishment Clause's concept of
neutrality is not self revealing, our recent cases have invested it with
specific content: the state may not favor or endorse either religion gen-
erally over nonreligion or one religion over others." ' Justice Souter
curring).
248. Id. at 2670 (Souter, J., concurring). The framers were particularly aware of the
origins of Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, Justice Souter pointed out, which
was enacted to protect colonists against any establishment of religion, however
nonpreferentialist. Thomas Jefferson wrote the statute and James Madison sponsored
it. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 2671-72 (Souter, J., concurring). Rather, Justice Souter declared, to adopt
such an interpretation would be to abandon settled law, for the Court has declared
invalid many non-coercive government practices aiding religion. Id. (Souter, J., con-
curring).
250. Id. at 2672 (Souter, J., concurring).
251. Justice Souter disputed the claim that because the early Presidents included
religious messages in their speeches that the framers did not intend the Establish-
ment Clause to prohibit such noncoercive state conduct. Id. at 2673-75 (Souter, J.,
concurring). On the contrary, Justice Souter characterized the use of such prayers by
Jefferson and Madison as mere diversions from the principle often stated by both
that the Establishment Clause encompasses such noncoercive religious activity. Id.
(Souter, J., concurring).
To be sure, the leaders of the young Republic engaged in some of the prac-
tices that separationists like Jefferson and Madison criticized. The First Con-
gress did hire institutional chaplains ... and Presidents Washington and
Adams unapologetically marked days of public thanksgiving, and prayer ....
Those practices prove, at best, that the Framers simply did not share a com-
mon understanding of the Establishment Clause, and, at worst, that they, like
other politicians, could raise constitutional ideals one day and turn their
backs on them the next.
Id. at 2675 (Souter, J., concurring).
252. Id. at 2672-73 (Souter, J., concurring). "In Madison's words, the Clause in its
final form forbids 'everything like' a national religious establishment ... and, after
incorporation, it forbids 'everything like' a State religious establishment." Id. (Souter,
J., concurring).
253. Id. at 2676 (Souter, J., concurring). For an extensive analysis of the flaws in
the no endorsement test, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV.
266 (1987) (characterizing the no endorsement test as a "doctrinal dead end" and
pointing out the futility of seeking neutrality as a guide to church-state conduct).
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characterized this principle as "the foundation of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence,.. . protecting religion from the demeaning effects of any
governmental embrace. " '
D. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia delivered a scathing dissent in reaction to the Court's
decision, which he characterized as a "jurisprudential disaster."' Sig-
naling the tone that he would assume throughout, Justice Scalia began
by holding up to Justice Kennedy his own words from Allegheny Coun-
ty v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU." In Allegheny, Scalia reminded the
Court, Justice Kennedy insisted that the Establishment Clause "must be
construed in light of the '[gjovernment policies of accommodation, ac-
knowledgment, and support for religion [that] are an accepted part of
our political and cultural heritage." ' 7 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy
claimed in Allegheny that any reading of the Clause that would "invali-
date longstanding traditions cannot be a proper reading of the
Clause."2" Justice Scalia continued by reminding Justice Kennedy of
yet another earlier remark of his: "[T]he meaning of the Clause is to be
254. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2676 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter acknowl-
edged that governmental neutrality did not foreclose governmental accommodation of
religion under the Free Exercise Clause. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Permissible
accommodation, he stated, "lift[s] a discernible burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion." Id. at 2677 (Souter, J., concurring). When no burden exists, accommodation
becomes an impermissible establishment of religion. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). For
extended discussions of the relationship between the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, see PHILLIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND
THE SUPREME COURT (1962); Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PrrT L, REV. 673 (1980); J. Morris Clark,
Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L REV. 327 (1969); Donald A.
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1381 (1967); John N. Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship Be-
tween the "Establishment" and "Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEX. L REV. 142 (1963);
Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE
L.J. 692 (1968).
255. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas.
256. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). In Allegheny, Justices Kennedy and Scalia were aligned
against the majority that found a Christmas crbche display violative of the First
Amendment. Id. at 655.
257. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2678 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S.
at 657).
258. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670).
determined by reference to historical 'practices and understandings." '
Calling the majority opinion "conspicuously bereft" of any historical
foundation, Justice Scalia accused the Court of laying waste an Ameri-
can tradition of nonsectarian prayer at public celebrations.' The
Court would have to be "oblivious to our history," Justice Scalia
claimed, to overlook the many governmental ceremonies and proclama-
tions existing in all three branches of the federal government in which
prayer plays an integral part without transforming the event into a reli-
gious exercise,"6 ' including the first public school graduation ceremony
in 1868." 2 In light of this, Justice Scalia reminded the Court, "inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause should comport with what histo-
ry reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of its guaran-
tees." ' The Justice then addressed both areas on which the majority
based its opinion.
1. State Involvement in a Religious Exercise
Justice Scalia dismissed in a mere two paragraphs the Court's charac-
terization of the state as having directed and controlled the school grad-
uation ceremonies." The Justice accused the Court of nothing less
259. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 670). In his relentless
pursuit of this theme, Justice Scalia declared that "our Nation's protection, that
fortress which is our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the changeable philo-
sophical predilections of the Justices of this Court." Id. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
260. Id. at 2678-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Actually, Justice Kennedy did refer to
America's tradition of ceremonial prayers when he distinguished Weisman from Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). However, Justice Kennedy used Marsh to empha-
size how different the ceremony in Weisman was from those types enumerated by
Justice Scalia. And, as has already been discussed, see supra notes 193, 228, and 244,
and accompanying text, Justices Kennedy, Blackmun, and Souter, as well as Justice
-Scalia, have all presented detailed historical support for their divergent opinions. In
fact, Justices Blackmun and Souter both provided substantially more historical au-
thority for their views than did Justice Scalia.
261. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2679-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 2680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia refers to the Court's reasoning
in an earlier case that "'[tihe existence from the beginning of the Nation's life of a
practice, [while] not conclusive of its constitutionality . . . , is a fact of considerable
import in the interpretation of the Establishment Clause.'" Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
Yet, as discussed above, Justice O'Connor raised the question of whether prayers at
public school graduations were even a practice at the time the Establishment Clause
was drafted (see supra note 127 and accompanying text). Justice Scalia has only "one
account" claiming that this is so. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 2682-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 21: 207, 19931 Lee v. Weisman
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
than distorting the record for its own purposes.2" No evidence, Justice
Scalia stated, supports the Court's claim of state direction and control:
the principal invited a member of the clergy to deliver a prayer at the
graduation ceremony and provided him with a two-page flyer giving
general advice on prayers for civic occasions.' Justice Scalia consid-
ered it "difficult to fathom" how the Court transformed these facts into
a violation of the U.S. Constitution. 7
2. State Coercion of Participation in a Religious Exercise
Justice Scalia considered the linchpin of the Court's opinion-that
the state had psychologically coerced student participation in a reli-
gious exercise-as "nothing short of ludicrous. " "2 Lambasting the
Court for its "psycho-journey" into the dynamics of peer pressure, Jus-
tice Scalia disparaged the Court's opinion as "psychology practiced by
amateurs."" Justice Scalia disputed' at length the Court's contention
that the act of simply sitting or standing quietly during the prayer sig-
naled forced participation in the ceremony.27 By doing either one, Jus-
tice Scalia claimed, the student could signal both her nonparticipation
and, at the same time, her respect for the views of others. 7'
265. Id. at 2683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
266. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Rather than this being direction and control, Justice
Scalia claimed, "directing" and "controlling" the graduation ceremonies "has a sound
of liturgy to it" and provoked images for him of a formal religious exercise, in which
the principle directs "acolytes where to carry the cross" or shows "the rabbi where
to unroll the Torah." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
267. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). There is nothing in the record, Justice Scalia empha-
sized, "remotely suggesting that school officials have ever drafted, edited, screened or
censored" the prayers "or that Rabbi Gutterman was a mouthpiece of the school offi-
ciais." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 2681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
269. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Interestingly enough, three years earlier, Justice
Kennedy lambasted the Allegheny Court for it "psycho journey" of 'sorts into the
dynamics of religious symbolism, accusing the Court of transforming itself into a
"national theology board." Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
678 (1989).
270. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia points out
the rather innocuous nature of simply sitting or standing during the prayers by em-
phasizing that the students were not "psychologically coerced to bow their heads,
place their hands in a Duirer-like prayer position, pay attention to prayers, utter
'Amen,' or in fact pray." Id. at 2681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 2681-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is "beyond the absurd," Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia also took issue with the Court's presumption that psy-
chological coercion could constitute a violation of the Establishment
Clause.' The coercion that the First Amendment was enacted to pre-
vent, the Justice claimed, was coercion of religious compliance by force
of law or threat of penalty." There is no reason, Justice Scalia stated,
to expand the coercion concept to include a psychological dimension
not intended by the framers of the First Amendment.274 Justice Scalia
distinguished Weisman from the school-prayer cases, in which students
are legally coerced (under threat of penalty) to attend school.7 In
contrast, the Justice claimed, Deborah Weisman's graduation ceremony
was "utterly devoid of legal compulsion."27 Furthermore, Justice
Scalia stated, prayer in the classroom, which is essentially an instruc-
tional setting, raises special concerns that a voluntary prayer at a one-
time graduation ceremony does not.'
claimed, to believe that a student who remained seated during a prayer while the
rest of the class stood was signaling any participation in the prayer. Id. at 2682
(Scaiia, J., dissenting). And even if the student did stand during the prayer, the
Justice stated, it is just as reasonable to assume that the student is standing out of
respect for the ceremony as it is to assume that the student is actually participating.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia took his argument one step further by sar-
castically questioning why the Court was not similarly concerned that the students
had also stood for the Pledge of Allegiance, which contained not only political, but
also religious orthodoxy in the phrase "under God." Scalia asked if that would be the
next target for the Court's "bulldozer of its social engineering." Id. (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
272. Id. at 2683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
273. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Scalia does not dispute that coercion
is a component of an Establishment Clause violation, and in fact concedes that he
has "no quarrel with the Court's general proposition that the Establishment Clause
'guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in reli-
gion.'" Id. at 2684 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He contends, however, that based on the
context in which the First Amendment was drafted, Justice Kennedy's "psychological
coercion" is not the type the Clause was meant to prohibit. Rather, the Clause was a
protection against coercion of religious worship, forced tithes and taxes for the
church, and punishment for noncompliance. Id. at 2683-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
274. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 2684-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting). These cases in no way "compel the
Court's psycho journey," Justice Scalia claimed. Id. at 2684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The coercion that justified the invalidation of the prayers in the classroom was the
legal coercion on the students to attend school. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The ques-
tion of whether coercion exists in the classroom "is quite different" from the question
of whether forbidden coercion exists at a graduation ceremony, where the student is
not compelled to attend. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
277. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia acknowledged the power of peer pres-
sure, but in a different context than the Court had done. In the classroom, the Jus-
tice claimed, parents are not present to counter "the students' emulation of teachers
as role models and the children's susceptibility to peer pressure." Id. (Scalia, J.,
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However, the Court's "lamentable decision" had at least one "happy
byproduct," Justice Scalia declared. The Court had seemingly
abandoned the Lemon test, characterized by Justice Scalia as a "formu-
laic abstraction" in conflict with the nation's history and traditions.2"
Justice Scalia regretted, however, that the Court replaced Lemon with
the psycho-coercion test, "which suffers from the double disability of
having no roots whatever in our people's historic practice, and being as
infinitely expandable as the reasons for psychotherapy itself."2"
Referring to the "odd basis for the Court's decision,"' Justice Scalia
concluded his opinion with a rather odd statement of his own. Justice
Scalia stated that in spite of what the Court had just proclaimed in
Weisman, public schools will be able to include prayers in their gradua-
tion ceremonies as usual as long as they make it clear that no student
is compelled to participate in them."8 For, while Deborah Weisman's
interests have been addressed throughout, the Justice noted, the "inter-
ests on the other side" of the issue are consequential as well.' Justice
Scalia emphasized the power of prayer and the need to "acknowledge
and beseech the blessing of God as a people and not just as individu-
als."' "One can believe in the effectiveness of such public worship or
one can deprecate and deride it. But the longstanding American tradi-
tion of prayer at official ceremonies displays with unmistakable clarity
that the Establishment Clause does not forbid the government to ac-
commodate it." ' 4
dissenting). Prayer at a graduation ceremony attended by friends and family, Justice
Scalia continued, does not raise the same concerns, Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
278.. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court demonstrated "the irrelevance of Lemon
by essentially ignoring it." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
279. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
280. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). To evade the Weisman Court's decision, Justice
Scalia advised, a school need only include a statement with the graduation program,
clarifying that even though all students will be asked to stand for the invocation and
benediction, students are not compelled to join in the prayers and will not be
thought to be participating simply because they are standing with the group. Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
282. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 2686 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "[Niothing, absolutely nothing," the Justice
stated, "is so inclined to foster among religious believers of various faiths a tolera-
tion-no, an affection-for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together."
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
284. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Judicial Impact
The decision in Lee v. Weisman signaled the arrival of what commen-
tators have characterized as a moderately conservative "troika" in the
Supreme Court.' Justices Kennedy, Souter, and O'Connor make up
this "subgroup" of what court watchers had presumed was a fimnly en-
trenched conservative majority. They are exhibiting "a generally cau-
tious approach to deciding cases, a hesitancy to overturn precedents
and a distaste for aggressive arguments. " ' Observers have attributed
this shift in the mood of the Court to various factors, "from the nature
of conservatism, to the maturing of the justices, the weight of the job's
responsibility and the justices' differing personalities." 7 Whatever the
285. Linda Greenhouse, Changed Path for Court?: New Balance Is Held By 3 Cau-
tious Justices, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1992, at Al. Although the Court's rulings on over
100 cases during the 1991-92 term suggest a decidedly conservative Court, "favoring
government over an individual's liberties, business over labor, police power over
criminals' rights," several high-profile decisions, including Weisman, issued during the
Court's final weeks surprised court watchers and support the troika theory advanced
by many of them. Dick Lehr, Centrist Troika Slows the Right on High Court, BOS-
TON GLOBE, July 3, 1992, at 1.
286. Greenhouse, supra note 285, at Al. Kenneth Starr, the former Bush
Administration's Solicitor General, refused to downplay the Weisman decision, which
he called "just stunning .... It says something very significant about the mood of
the Court. It's really a new Court." Id. And an "unhappy Court," according to Robert
Bork, former Supreme Court nominee, who attacked the Court for its trend toward
an "ahistorical and free-handed liberalism." Robert H. Bork, Again, a Struggle for the
Soul of the Court, N.Y. TMES, July 8, 1992, at A-19.
287. Lehr, supra note 285, at 1. Personality is a factor that has been underestimat-
ed, claims University of Michigan law professor Yale Kamisar, referring to Scalia's
"slashing style." Id. Other commentators have questioned whether the troika is "re-
sponding almost viscerally to the swashbuckling reach of opinions by Justices Scalia
and Thomas." Greenhouse, supra note 285, at Al. Addressing the personality issue,
Richard Samp, chief counsel for the conservative Washington Legal Foundation, called
for more consensus-building among the conservative justices. "Unfortunately," he
stated, "Scalia, although the most powerful intellect, is not only not good at consen-
sus-building; he even goes out of his way to criticize colleagues who deign to stray
slightly from how he sees things." Lehr, supra note 285, at 1. The troika might also
represent an emergence from the shadows of mentors and supporters, Yale Kamisar
suggested, to avoid being labeled as someone's "clone or subordinate." Id. "For
O'Connor, observers said, it meant emerging . . .from the shadow of Rehnquist, who
strongly supported her nomination .... For Kennedy and Souter . . . it has meant
.emerging as much more complicated and open-minded than anyone expected.'" Id. In
fact, Justice Souter is "a far cry from what conservatives thought they were getting"
when the White House assured them that he would be a "home run." Paul M.
Barrett, Independent Justice: Souter Irks Rightists, SACRAMENTO BEE, February, 14,
1993, at Fl. That prediction was. "miserably inaccurate," complained Thomas Jipping,
a prominent support-raiser for nominee Souter and vice president of the Free Con-
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factors, court observers agree that Weisman confirms that the Court "is
not on the runaway right-wing course that conservatives and liberals
alike had predicted from a group molded by Presidents Bush and Rea-
gan." 8
However, Weisman failed to clearly delineate what would be the
Court's future course. Rather than shape a definitive standard for Estab-
lishment Clause analysis, the majority in Weisman relied on a theory
of psychological coercion that, if it withstands future criticism, will
most likely only be useful in a limited number of school cases similar to
Weisman.' In addition, noticeably absent from Justice Kennedy's
opinion was any reliance on the various existing analytical approaches,
most particularly the Lemon test." This may signal either a future over-
ruling of the Lemon decision, although Justice Kennedy declined to do
so in the case at hand, or, less drastically, a future reconsideration of
the Lemon test. If it expressly overrules Lemon, the Supreme Court
could open the door to government subsidies for church-related
schools,' a dramatic departure from past concerns about the separa-
gress Foundation. Id.
288. Lehr, supra note 285, at 1. This is an especially provocative development in
light of the recently announced retirement of Justice White and the expected retire-
ment of at least one other justice during the new Democratic administration. Al-
though Justice Blackmun, author of Roe v. Wade, has not announced retirement
plans, at 84 he is the oldest justice on the Court. Where it was once believed that
Roe survived by one vote alone, Roe has found unexpected support in the new Court,
signaling that perhaps the "wall of separationists" will find similar support. Id.
289. Narrow cases can have broad impact. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971), although the Court's decision related to the limited question of state subsidies,
the Court's reasoning became the cornerstone of Establishment Clause analysis. In the
same way, the Court's reasoning in Weisman could have far-reaching implications for
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
290. It seems unlikely that the psycho-coercion test would be a useful analytical
tool in an Establishment Clause challenge involving, for example, religious art on
postage stamps, state recognition of a religious holiday or state subsidies for private
school textbooks.
291. Justice Kennedy noted in passing that the lower court relied on the Lemon
test, finding petitioner's actions violative of the second prong, and that the state's
conduct can neither advance nor inhibit religion. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2654.
292. Marc Stern of the American Jewish Congress, among others, predicted that
abandoning the Lemon test completely "could allow more government aid to parochi-
al schools, make it easier to have religious displays on public property and permit
other governmental involvement with religion." Ruth Marcus, Justices Asked to Lower
Wall Between Church, State; If High Court Accepts Graduation Prayer Case, Ruling
Could Redefine Religion's Public Role, WASH. PosT, March 18, 1991, at A4.
tion of church and state.' If, on the other hand, the Lemon test is re-
considered, the Court will be questioning an analytical tool that once
was considered the cornerstone of Establishment Clause analysis. 9 4
When the Court agreed to review Lee v. Weisman, it shelved a num-
ber of cases, pending that decision. 5 The implication was that the
Court believed Weisman would provide an important analytical tool in
Establishment Clause analysis. On the contrary, the decision seems to
narrowly apply to a very specific set of circumstances, leaving the
Court with, what one observer termed, its "notoriously incoherent Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence."'
293. Bruce Fein, Prayer and Psycho-Law, WASH. TIMES, June 26, 1992, at Fl. Fein
claims that Weisman confirms that five justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with
Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas-are prepared to overrule Lemon to
improve relations between state and religion. Id. However, August Steinhilber, general
counsel to the National Association of School Boards, does not believe that the Court
will form a coalition to depart from Lemon's strict church-state separation for a more
liberal standard that would bar the state only from coercing people into religious
practice. Marshall Ingwerson, High Court's School-Prayr Ruling Puts Bush's Voucher
Plan in Doubt, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., June 26, 1992, at 1. Mark Tushnet, law professor
at Georgetown University Law Center agreed. "From the tone of the opinion,"
Tushnet stated, "Kennedy is saying we've gone about as far from a classic
separationist doctrine as we are going to go." Id. Tushnet, however, allowed that the
Court might move to a coercion test in a future case. Id.
294. However, the Lemon test is not short on critics. "The Lemon test gave the
illusion of Euclidian certitude, but has failed miserably as respectable constitutional
doctrine. Its three prongs are divorced from the language and purposes of the estab-
lishment clause, and their multiple ambiguities have fostered idiosyncratic rulings."
Bruce Fein, Recasting Church State Doctrine, WASH. TIMES, July 30, 1991, at GI. The
Justice Department criticized the test's "rigid doctrinal framework" as "the source of
widespread confusion and deep division among the lower federal courts." Marcus,
supra note 292, at A4. Yehudah Mirsky discusses the analytical flaws in the Lemon
test, among them that its "crisp dichotomies (secular/religious, advance/not-advance,
excessive/acceptable entanglement) are themselves not supple enough to do justice to
the complex nature of church-state interaction. "Civil Religion and the Establishment
Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1243 (1986).
295. Ban on School Prayer is Upheld; Court Stuns Conservatives by Reitforcing
Church-State Split, STAR TRIB., June 25, 1992, at IA. In the wake of Weisman, the
Court during the 1992-93 term will be considering several of these cases and perhaps
will illuminate the analytical direction of the Court for the future. In Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District, 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit
held that state funding of a sign-language interpreter at a Catholic high school vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 936
F.2d 586 (lth Cir. 1991), the named church challenged a state law banning animal
sacrifice as a restraint on their free exercise of religion. In Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), a religious group is
challenging the school's refusal to allow them after-hours use of public school facil-
ities.
296. Terry Eastland, Prayer and Psycho-Law, WASH. TIMES, June 26, 1992, at Fl.
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B. Impact on Education
1. Higher Education
The Weisman Court never drew a firm line at the high school border
to indicate that graduation prayers at post-high school ceremonies
would be acceptable. 7 However, based on Justice Kennedy's reason-
ing in the majority opinion, it is unlikely that Weisman will affect pub-
lic college graduation ceremonies. The majority justified its "psychologi-
cal coercion" test primarily because of its "heightened concerns with
protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the
elementary and secondary public schools." 'a Justice Kennedy stressed
that the Court's opinion was "fact sensitive" and limited to this context
and no other.' By this language, the Justice implied that the Court
had no interest in extending the "psychological coercion" test to higher
education.'
2. Elementary and Secondary Schools
Justice Scalia's contention that Weisman's impact will be limited is
being debated by school officials, social commentators, and legal ob-
servers." According to Justice Scalia, prayers at future public school
297. Bruce Fein, in a newspaper commentary, went so far as to herald the Court's
decision as "a strategic defeat for church-state separationists," because it did not
overtly bar prayers during state college or university ceremonies. Bruce Fein, Prayer
and Psycho-Law, WASH. TIMES, June 26, 1992, at Fl.
298. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2657.
299. Throughout his opinion, Justice Kennedy referred to "adolescents," "young
graduates," "young people" and students of "high school age."
300. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2661. In his dissent, Justice Scalia could not even toler-
ate the test for high school seniors, claiming that high school graduation signifies "a
transition from adolescence to young adulthood .... Why, then, does the Court
treat them as though they were first-graders?" Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This
argument could be made with even more force if the psychological coercion test
were imposed on college graduates, where, presumably, there is more maturity and
less peer pressure to submit.
301. When the Supreme Court granted review of Weisman, 35 religious, political
and educational groups, including the National School Boards Association and the
National Association of School Boards, filed or joined briefs to the Court. The educa-
tion groups said they wanted clear guidance from the Supreme Court, but more than
that, observers note, "[r]eading these briefs makes it clear that to vast sections of the
public, this case poses not an abstract issue of constitutional doctrine, but an urgent
question of national self definition." Linda Greenhouse, The Fight Over God's Place in
America's Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1991, at B1O [hereinafter Greenhouse, The
graduations will continue as usual, with minor modifications,' in the
wake of Weisman.' However, the Weisman Court laid down ground
rules that suggest this will not be the case: elementary and secondary
public school officials are prohibited from participating in graduation
ceremony prayers. Based on Weisman's reasoning, it is likely that "par-
ticipating" could include anything from writing the prayer and selecting
the speaker to providing the podium and even, perhaps, to distributing
the "No Coercion" announcement that Justice Scalia suggests will solve
the problem.
As the graduation season approaches, school districts, state lawmak-
ers, and special interest groups are trying to construe Weisman for
their own purposes. In the wake of Weisman, the American Center for
Law and Justice, evangelist Pat Robertson's conservative legal group,
sent a letter to the nation's public school superintendents, informing
them that "student-initiated" prayer is constitutional.' The American
Civil Liberties Union fired back with their own letter, warning the su-
perintendents that any graduation prayer would violate the constitu-
tion."5 However, it appears that, in varying degrees, school districts
Fight]; Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Take Fresh Look at Disputed Church
State Boundary, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 1991, at A16 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Supreme
Court].
302. Justice Scalia advised that school officials will simply have to inform attendees
that they are not compelled to join in the prayers and assure them that the fact that
they are standing will not send a message that they are participating. Weisman, 112
S. Ct. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Solicitor General Kenneth Starr, who appeared
on behalf of the former Bush Administration to urge the court to allow the prayers,
concurred that the decision does not place an absolute ban on prayers at graduation
ceremonies. Ban on School Prayer is Upheld; Court Stuns Conservatives by Reinforc-
ing Church-State Split, STAR TRIB., June 25, 1992, at 1A. Starr suggested the possibili-
ty that student-initiated prayers, unsupervised by school officials, might hurdle the ob-
stacles set up by Justice Kennedy's Court. Id.
303. Although many public schools have already eliminated prayers from their
graduation ceremonies, many others still have them. According to the National School
Board Association, of the 21 major school districts surveyed, 14 allowed graduation
prayers and several other districts claimed that they would also if they did not fear
lawsuits. Greenhouse, The Fight, supra note 301 at B10.
304. ACLU Mails Warnings on Prayer at' Grad Ceremonies, L.A. TIMES, May 15,
1993, at B5 [hereinafter ACLU Mails Warnings]. Robertson's group relied on the Fifth
Circuit's ruling in Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir.
1992), which was decided several months after Weisman. In Clear Creek, the court
upheld prayers at graduation ceremonies as long as a majority of the students voted
in favor of them. Id. at 969. Robertson's group plans to dispatch so-called "SWAT
teams" nationwide to inform schools of this loophole that will allow them to include
student-sponsored prayer in their graduation ceremonies. ACLU Mails Warnings at
B5; Graduation Prayers, Again, WASH. POST, May 12, 1993, at A18.
305. ACLU Mails Warnings, supra note 304 at B5. In its counter-mailing, the ACLU
denounced the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Clear Creek as "wrongly decided." Id. "Consti-
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across the country are finding ways to get around Weisman as they
bow to community pressure for graduation prayers." Some schools
are simply flouting the Supreme Court decision by openly planning
graduation prayers; in other schools, students are protesting with walk-
outs, mass mailings to their congressional representatives, or "surprise"
prayers during the ceremony. 7 Additionally, some state legislatures
have passed laws to override Weisman's prohibition on prayer." Civil
libertarians oppose acts that encourage student-initiated prayer, con-
tending that such prayer at state-sponsored events remains coercive."
Some school officials and legal observers caught in the middle predict
dramatic changes in future graduation ceremonies, while others consid-
er the decision ambiguous in its implications.' 0
3. Legislative Impact
At the same time that Justice Kennedy was announcing the opinion
of the Court in Lee v. Weisman, the former Bush administration was
putting the final touches on its voucher plan for schools."' This plan
would have allowed parents to use a $1000 annual education voucher at
any school of their choice, including religious schools.312 In light of the
Court's decision in Weisman, and in light of the Court's reluctance to
turn away from its prior Lemon holding,"' former President Bush's
tutional rights would be meaningless," the ACLU claimed, "if they could be overruled
by a vote" of the students. Id. Seemingly applying Weisman's coercion test, other
civil liberties advocates considered putting the prayer question to a student vote, the
worst solution yet because "it could increase peer pressure and stigmatize students
who ...don't want a prayer." Tony Mauro, Prayer Issue Graduates to Next Debate,
USA TODAY, May 12, 1993, at IA.
306. Larry Witham, Schools Get Around Court's Ban on Prayer, WASH. TIMES, May
22, 1993, at Al.
307. Id.
308. Id. The Arkansas legislature, for example, amended its equal access law to
allow student-planned religious graduation ceremonies. Id. Similarly, the Tennessee
legislature voted overwhelmingly to pass a bill allowing student-initiated prayer, which
the governor is expected to sign in spite of warnings from the state attorney general
that it is unconstitutional. Id.
309. Id.
310. Mary Jordan, Changes Await Most School Ceremonies: Prayer Ban Still Ambig-
uous, Attorneys Say, WASH. POST, June 25, 1992, at A25.
311. Marshall Ingwerson, High Court's School-Prayer Ruling Puts Bush's Voucher
Plan in Doubt, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., June 26, 1992, at 1.
312. Id.
313. There are obvious similarities between Lemon's prohibition of state-subsidized
voucher plan would likely have met strong resistance in 1993.' 4 How-
ever, President Clinton has already voiced vehement opposition to the
voucher plan, substituting instead a charter school plan that does not
involve federal aid to private education.3"5 Thus, President Clinton, char-
acterized by his campaign press secretary as "a religious man,"3 6 has
rushed to assert, at least in one area, his view of the proper relation-
ship between church and state. " '
religious education and the Bush plan. Of course, in Lemon, religious schools re-
ceived subsidies directly from the state, while, in the voucher plan, it would appear
that the parent serves as middleman between the church and state.
314. Various voucher plans are currently being proposed and debated nationwide,
some extending the subsidy to private schools and others expressly excluding them.
For a thoughtful analysis of the constitutional obstacles to school voucher plans, see
James B. Egle, Comment, The Constitutional Implications of School Choice, 1992
Wis. L. REV. 459 (1992) (concluding that the Establishment Clause may not necessari-
ly preclude state subsidies for private education).
315. Ronald Brownstein, What the Puss Will Be About, LA. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at
Al. In the charter school plan, the state would grant charters to parents, teachers or
community organizations within the public school system to set up alternative schools
and would provide funding to the students attending the charter schools. Id. Within a
matter of weeks after President Clinton's inauguration, California governor Pete Wil-
son proposed charter school districts within the state and is preparing legislation on
the issue. Wilson intends this legislation to counteract an upcoming ballot initiative
for a school voucher program. Daniel M. Weintraub, Wilson Calls for Schools to Set
Own Rules, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1993, at Al.
316. Ari L. Goldman, Religion Notes, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1992, at 1-9.
317. However, many questions about President Clinton's overall view of the relation-
ship between church and state persist. Dee Dee Myers, press secretary for the Demo-
cratic campaign, emphasized that for Clinton, "[tihe Bible is an important part of his
life. He is inspired by it and to a large extent guided by it." Ad L. Goldman, supra
note 316, at 1-9. President Clinton invited evangelist Billy Graham to deliver an invo-
cation and benediction at the presidential inauguration in January. Paul Houston,
Transition Watch, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at A5. Also, in a pre-election speech at
the University of Notre Dame, President Clinton aligned himself with the Catholic "so-
cial mission" of "service to the poor and fidelity to God's justice." Colman McCarthy,
Pandering to Pat Robertson, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1992, at A21. Further, Vice Presi-
dent Gore's book, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT, "just
oozes religious faith." Peter Steinfels, The 1992 Campaign: Religion in Politics;
Southern Baptists Team of Democrats Represents a New Strain of the Church, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1992, at A31. In light of Gore's promise to elevate environmental issues
to top priority in the Clinton Administration, observers cannot help but note that
Gore's environmental policy is firmly "rooted in the unshakable belief in God as
creator and sustainer, a deeply personal interpretation of and relationship with Christ,
and an awareness of a constant and holy spiritual presence in all people, all life, and
all things." ALBERT GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 368
(1992). Even Hillary Clinton has publicly acknowledged her commitment to "[daily
prayer and reflection." Steinfels, supra at A31. However, some observers feel that,
unlike Jimmy Carter, who taught Sunday School while in office and often made
others uncomfortable with his "forthright piety, . . . Mr. Clinton and Mr. Gore do not
speak of being born. again and having their hearts cleansed by Jesus." Id. Thus, al-
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C. Social Impact
According to one Washington Times commentator and social scien-
tist,318 the Weisman decision will confirm in the minds of many that
their public schools "cannot be friendly to the religious beliefs of most
Americans, even if they wanted to be."" ' Parents are already discour-
aged with what appears to be a "value-free" public school system, dis-
pensing condoms and outlawing prayers."o Yet, according to public
polls, a large majority of the American public did not object to prayers
in school thirty years ago when the Supreme Court first banned them,
and an almost identical majority expressed approval of school prayers
as late as last year.'
Predictably, conservative groups expressed outrage at the Weisman
ruling. 2 This opinion was handed down by a conservative Court,'
though President Clinton has opposed prayer in public schools, id., how the religious
factor overall will eventually play out in the Clinton Administration is unclear.
318. Terry Eastland is a resident fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center.
319. Eastland, supra note 296, at Fl. Interestingly enough, three years ago in Alle-
gheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) Justice Kennedy
repeatedly accused the Court of "hostility" and "callous indifference" toward religion
for their decision that the display of a crbche was unconstitutional.
320. Id. Capturing this spirit, a South Carolina legislator, commenting on an Estab-
lishment Clause challenge to the distribution of Bibles in school, remarked: "What
kind of sense does it make when you can't pass out the Bible but you can pass out
condoms . . . ?" Isabel Wilkerson, Bible Giveaway is a Rural Ritual to Some, an
Offense to Others, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1992, at 1-12. This spirit is echoed across the
country. In 1992, the South Carolina Board of Education encouraged "a moment of
silent meditation" in the schools, reasoning that "[plublic school children need the in-
spiration, motivation, and discipline of the religious values on which our country was
founded." Id. About 20 southern states have enacted similar laws, in spite of court
prohibitions against them. "[P]rayer and Bible distribution go on in schools because
townspeople quietly agree to it no matter what the courts have said." Id.
321. In 1962, Gallup conducted the poll, in which almost four-fifths approved of
school prayers. In 1991, Yankelovich Clancy Shulman obtained virtually the same
results. While a majority of Americans endorse the separation of church and state,
"they don't see voluntary prayer in the schools as violative of that principle." Everett
C. Ladd, School Prayer Gets a New Day in Court, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., Mar. 20,
1992, at 18.
322. David G. Savage, Prayers Banned at School Ceremonies; Supreme Court: The
Justices Rule 5 to 4 that Grade School and High School Officials May Not Invoke
Name of God. Decision is a Setback for Bush Administration., LA. TIMES, June 25,
1992, at Al.
323. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy were appointed by Ronald Reagan; Justice
Souter was appointed by George Bush.
and based on earlier Court decisions allowing religious clubs on school
campuses and religious symbols in Christmas displays, 4 it was as-
.sumed that the Court would allow the graduation prayers, characterized
by former President Bush as part of a "venerable and proper American
tradition." 5 Conservative spokespersons accused the Court of using
the First Amendment for religious censorship, and one conservative
spokesman complained that the decision "sounds like the Warren
Court."n
Thus, although Weisman's impact is somewhat uncertain, it will sure-
ly be felt as the year progresses-in the June 1993 graduation ceremo-
nies across the nation, in the Supreme Court's 1993 Term decisions, and
in parents' reactions to President Clinton's school proposals. Only then
will it be clear whether Weisman has, in fact, provided the "important
restatement of core principles" 7 that was hoped for or, more likely,
whether Weisman has become a mere footnote in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lee v. Weisman is a case rich in dimension. Although ostensibly
about a school graduation ceremony, Weisman raises issues that go to
the heart of Establishment Clause analysis. In Weisman, the Court had
the opportunity to explore how a religion is "established": what does a
state do to "advance" a religion; how can the Court determine if a reli-
gion is benefitted by a state action; when is prayer not a religious activ-
ity. The Court, however, missed the opportunity to explore these con-
troversial core issues in any meaningful way. Instead, Weisman pro-
duced four opinions that substantially confused an already muddled
area of the law. Rather than clarify whether the Lemon test, formerly
the centerpiece of Court analysis, remained the proper analytical ap-
proach for Establishment Clause challenges, the majority largely ig-
nored the test, the concurring opinions praised it, and the dissent glee-
fully buried it. Equally confusing, each opinion steadfastly relied on
history and tradition to support these, at times, entirely divergent views.
And "coercion," said to be the key to the majority decision, was given
as many interpretations as there were opinions.
Rather than moving the Court forward, the Weisman Court returned
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to the old myth of the wall, the strict separationist position that, from
the start, has been impossible for the Court to maintain. Weisman
could have been a landmark decision, in which the Court finally shaped
a coherent analytical theory for this much-unsettled area of the law.
Instead, Weisman became just another brick in the "blurred, indistinct"
wall of separation.
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